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This study seeks to re-emphasise the importance of legitimacy when analysing normative 
contestation. Using empirical analysis, the discourse of the five permanent members of the 
UNSC is explored, revealing the legitimation practices used by actors to influence the 
collective legitimacy judgements of others and thus shape the normative conversation. Such 
rhetorical practices, adopted by each member of the P5, are used to both legitimise an actor’s 
own approach, whilst delegitimising the approach of others that do not share their interests. 
Actors adopt narratives which drive their own interests into the conversation; they are 
justified using references to authority, morals, history and their self-professed expertise. 
UNSC activity is shaped by this rhetoric, which, as a result of the power imbalance inside the 
UNSC, is primarily western. The western powers advocate for a humanitarian approach by 
utilising practices which evoke emotions and encourage the audience to adopt their morals. In 
response, those actors seeking to protect the former status quo rely on references to law and 
order, striving to ensure their interests remain relevant. The confidence shown by those 
seeking to reshape the international system is a reflection of their confidence as international 
players. The analysis demonstrates the importance of rhetorical analysis when studying 
normative contestation. Without paying attention to the legitimation practices used by actors 
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Unprovoked and distorted attacks against the solemn position of other members represent a 
very irresponsible action... In and of itself, that serves as a good example of how certain 

















1 Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, S/PV.7893, 28 February 2017 
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1 - Introduction  
 
For the past two decades the study of international norms and normative change has 
been a prominent feature of the constructivist scholarship. Initially the research sought to 
show why norms matter and largely ignored processes of change and contestation.2 However, 
in recent years the inherently contested nature of norms has started to receive more attention 
and recent works seek to explain how and why norms change,3 theories of normative 
contestation,4 who is contesting norms,5 what roles actors play when contesting norms,6 and 
even what tools are used by actors to contest norms.7 What is particularly striking about much 
of the literature is the absence of another key concept, that of legitimacy, which ought to be 
central to the study of normative change, since it allows one to understand why changes 
within a normative community are accepted. Whilst a number of scholars recognise the 
importance of legitimacy in the study of norms, most notably Finnemore and Sikkink who 
drove the study of norms into mainstream IR theory,8 there is far less research which seeks to 
explain how actors rely on legitimacy to drive normative change. The present thesis seeks to 
re-emphasise the concept of legitimacy in the study of normative change by highlighting the 
rhetorical techniques and patterns of behaviour used by actors when contesting norms. Using 
empirical analysis, the discourse of the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) will be explored to reveal the tactical practices used by actors to legitimise 
their words, persuade others and shape the normative conversation. The following research 
 
2 Finnemore, M., The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2003); Risse, T. and others (ed), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and 
Domestic Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K., 
‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, Vol. 52 (4) (1998) International Organization 887 – 917; 
Björkdahl, A. ‘Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections’ Vol. 15 (1) 
(2002) Cambridge Review of International Affairs 9 – 23  
3 Keck, M. and Sikkink, K., Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Pres, 1998); Sandholtz, W. and Stiles, K., International Norms and Cycles of Change (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Van Kersbergen, K. and Verbeek, B., ‘The Politics of International 
Norms: Subsidiarity and the Imperfect Competence Regime of the European Union’, Vol. 13 (2) (2007) 
European Journal of International Relations 217 – 238  
4 Wiener, A., A Theory of Contestation (Berlin: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014) 
5 Wiener, A., Contestation and Constitution of Norms in Global International Relations (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018); Jones, C., China’s Challenge to Liberal Norms: The Durability of International Order 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018) 
6 Bloomfield, A., ‘Norm antripreneurs and theorising resistance to normative change’, Vol. 42 (2) (2016) 
Review of International Studies 310 – 333  
7 Booth Walling, C., All Necessary Measures: The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013) 
8 Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. op. cit. at note 2 
7 
 
questions, which focus on legitimation practices and collective legitimacy judgements, will 
be explored: 
 
1. How do actors legitimise themselves? 
2. How do actors try to influence the legitimacy judgements of others? 
 
In answering these questions, the study seeks to contribute to the growing body of 
literature on norms and normative change, both of which are of central importance to the 
theory of constructivism. Constructivism takes ‘a sociological perspective on world politics, 
emphasising the importance of normative as well as material structures, and the role of 
identity in the constitution of interests and action.’9 By highlighting the central role of 
legitimacy in the study of norms, the following thesis will contribute to the existing body of 
work in a new way. Few scholars include references to legitimacy in studies of normative 
change, despite the importance and centrality of the concept in the theory of constructivism. 
It is far more common for legitimacy to feature in studies of specific norms, for example 
Finnemore traced the historical development of justifications for the use of force and argued 
that over time, the effectiveness and profitability of using force depends more and more on its 
legitimacy.10 Much empirical research on normative contestation is heavily focused on the 
norms surrounding the use of force; recent scholarship focuses on the Libyan Conflict, the 
Syrian Civil War and the future of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).11 In much of this 
literature there is a recurring theme which emphasises the role of revisionist powers in the 
changing global order and highlights the contradictions between the norms of sovereignty and 
those of human rights.12 Such studies, whilst providing a useful analysis of the changing 
 
9 Price, R. and Reus-Smit, C., ‘Dangerous Liaisons? Constructivism and critical international theory’, Vol. 4 (3) 
(1998) European Journal of International Relations 259 – 294  
10 Finnemore, M. op. cit. at note 2 
11 Averre, D. and Davies, L., ‘Russia, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: the case of 
Syria’, Vol. 91 (4) (2015) International Affairs 813 – 834; Coen, A., ‘R2P, Global Governance, and the Syrian 
Refugee Crisis’, Vol. 19 (8) (2015) The International Journal of Human Rights 1044 – 1058; Ralph, J. and 
Souter, J., ‘Is R2P a Fully-Fledged International Norm?’, Vol. 3 (4) (2015) Politics and Governance 68 – 71; 
Teimouri, H., ‘Protecting while not being responsible: the case of Syria and responsibility to protect’, Vol. 19 
(8) (2015) The International Journal of Human Rights 1279 – 1289; Tocci, N., ‘On Power and Norms: Libya, 
Syria and the Responsibility to Protect’, Vol. 8 (1) (2016) Global Responsibility to Protect 51 – 75; Stahn, C., 
‘Between law-breaking and Law-making: Syria, Humanitarian Intervention and ‘What the Law ought to be’’, 
Vol. 19 (1) (2014) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 25 – 48  
12 Fung, C., ‘Separating Intervention from Regime Change: China’s Diplomatic Innovations at the UN Security 
Council Regarding the Syria Crisis’, Vol. 235 (2018) The China Quarterly 693 – 712; Lombardo, G., ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect and the lack of intervention in Syria between the protection of human rights and 
geopolitical strategies’, Vol. 19 (8) (2015) The International Journal of Human Rights 1190 – 1198; Pieper, M., 
‘‘Rising Power’ Status and the Evolution of International Order: Conceptualising Russia’s Syria Policies’, Vol. 
71 (3) (2019) Europe-Asia Studies 365 – 387; Snetkov, A. and Lanteigne, M., ‘‘The Loud Dissenter and its 
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nature of the international environment, are predictable and fail to explain why these changes 
are happening. Questions such as how states present themselves in the international 
community, how they use language to justify their opinions and how they interact with one 
another in the processes of contestation are largely ignored.  
 
By analysing the rhetorical practices and techniques used by actors to seek 
legitimation and thus implement change in the normative environment, this study aims to 
contribute to the field in a unique way. Two concepts of legitimacy will be incorporated into 
the study: legitimation practices and legitimacy judgements. With these concepts in mind, the 
discourse of the permanent members of the UNSC throughout the Syrian Civil War will be 
analysed. Previous empirical studies have already confirmed the existence of normative 
contestation and the uncertain nature of the future norms surrounding the use of force. Instead 
of repeating these studies, by analysing the same arguments used by actors to justify their 
actions, the analysis will focus on the rhetorical tips and tricks used by each actor to gain 
legitimacy and thus drive their own interpretation of a given norm into the conversation. The 
practice of framing will be deconstructed to reveal how actors frame their arguments and 
what tools they rely on to try and increase their own legitimacy or decrease the legitimacy of 
others. The research will take the study of normative contestation a step further by asking 
how actors use their position to influence change and shape the future path of the norms 
surrounding the use of force. 
 
 The study will proceed as follows: Chapter 2 will start by conceptualising both norms 
and normative contestation, before considering the development of the literature on 
normative contestation and how it fails to recognise the processes of legitimacy taking place. 
The concepts of legitimation practices and legitimacy judgements will then be introduced, 
followed by an analysis of the literature on legitimacy which demonstrates the importance of 
the concept and how it can help one to understand the behaviour of international actors. The 
final part of the chapter considers the literature that identifies some of the rhetorical practices  
used by actors to manipulate emotions and thus influence collective legitimacy judgements.  
 
Cautious Partner’ – Russia, China, global governance and humanitarian intervention’, Vol. 15 (1) (2015) 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 113 – 146; Kanet, R., ‘Russia and global governance: the challenge to 
the existing liberal order’, Vol. 55 (2) (2018) International Politics 177 – 188; Erameh, N., ‘Humanitarian 
Intervention, Syria and the politics of human rights protection’, Vol. 21 (5) (2017) The International Journal of 
Human Rights 517 – 530; Odeyemi, C., ‘Re-emerging Powers and the Impasse in the UNSC over R2P 
intervention in Syria’, Vol. 40 (2) (2016) Strategic Analysis 122 – 149 
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 Chapter 3 provides additional context which is necessary for understanding the 
dataset. This includes an analysis of the law surrounding the use of force, background to the 
Syrian conflict, and a summary of the literature which considers normative contestation in the 
UNSC throughout the Syrian conflict. Chapter 4 outlines the methodological framework used 
to collect, organise and analyse the data. It provides further information on the formal 
procedures of the UNSC and also considers any possible limitations of the study. 
 
 Chapter 5 is divided into three parts, each of which analyses one of the key findings 
of the study. The first part demonstrates how each actor has constructed a narrative which 
frames the issues in a way that prioritises their own interests. These narratives are legitimised 
using references to authority, morals, history and evidence of expertise. Such rhetorical 
practices are also used to (de)legitimise. The second part of the analysis, argues that UNSC 
activity is shaped by the rhetorical practices adopted by the members of the P5, which as a 
result of the power imbalance in the UNSC, are primarily western, and thus moralistic (as 
opposed to legalistic). The final part of the analysis argues that the approach adopted by each 
member of the P5 is defined by the way they view the UNSC and how much they rely on the 
organisation for international prestige. Finally, the thesis will conclude by revisiting the 
research questions and summarising the findings, both of which reaffirm the need to 


















2 - Norms, Normative Contestation and Legitimacy  
2.1 - Norms and Normative Contestation 
2.1.1 - Conceptualising Norms and Normative Contestation 
 
Within the field of constructivism, one of the prevailing definitions of a norm is ‘a 
standard of behaviour for actors with a given identity,’ as per Finnemore and Sikkink.13 If 
norms suggest appropriate ‘standards of behaviour’ for certain actors, those actors must share 
a common assessment or understanding of what that behaviour is. This understanding, or 
judgement, might signal approval if an actor adopts ‘norm-conforming behaviour’; 
disapproval if an actor displays ‘norm-breaking behaviour’; or if a norm has become so 
established in the community there might be no judgement whatsoever as the norm is now 
taken for granted.14 Katzenstein summarises this as ‘collective expectations for the proper 
behaviour of actors within a given identity.’15 It follows that, since norms prompt 
expectations, they also strengthen the likelihood of a norm being followed in the first place.16 
Thus, actors are prompted to provide justifications for their actions so as to prove that they 
are adopting norm-conforming behaviour. These justifications demonstrate the existence of 
norms and can be analysed to understand patterns of norm formation. It is important to 
recognise that norms are not purely subjective and idiosyncratic, as stressed by Björkdahl 
who highlights the importance of this justificatory discourse, or ‘rhetoric’, which itself proves 
the existence of shared norms.17 This shared quality of norms has presented a challenge to 
scholars seeking to understand normative contestation which led to disagreement within the 
scholarship on how to conceptualise contestation. 
 
The first wave of literature on norms paid little attention to processes of normative 
contestation and instead presented theories to explain why norms matter at all. Finnemore and 
Sikkink noted that normative contestation was likely to take place when norms ‘emerge in a 
highly contested normative space where they must compete with other norms and perceptions 
of interest,’18 but their work remained largely silent on what contestation entailed. Normative 
 
13 Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. op. cit. at note 2 
14 Ibid. 
15 Katzenstein, P. (ed), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996) Introduction 
16 Onuf, N., ‘Everyday Ethics in International Relations’, Vol. 27 (3) (1998) Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 669 – 693 as cited by Björkdahl, A. op. cit. at note 2 
17 Björkdahl, A. op. cit. at note 2  
18 Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. op. cit. at note 2 
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contestation was treated as ‘an obstacle rather than an inherent quality’19 and it was assumed 
that eventually socialisation of the norm would take place by other actors because they see it 
as ‘the right thing to do.’20 The body of literature is criticised for implying that ‘‘enlightened’ 
western norm entrepreneurs ‘guided’ ‘unenlightened’ non-western norm followers,’21 who 
eventually saw sense and internalised the norm. Wiener termed these earlier studies 
‘compliance studies’ because they assumed that actors were pressured or persuaded to 
comply with norms and become socialised into a normative community which they had no 
part in shaping.22  
 
Wiener’s approach to normative contestation marked a change from previous studies 
which she criticised for taking norms to be ontological facts. Instead, she maintains in her 
research, that norms are ‘inherently contested and therefore subject to change.’23 She 
conceptualises normative contestation as ‘a social practice of objecting to or critically 
engaging in norms.’24 Niemann and Schillinger argue that her conceptualisation of a 
contested norm presents a contradiction; they question how a norm can be both contested and 
shared at the same time. They conducted a grammatical reading of Wiener’s approach to 
norms and argue that, whilst she recognised that contestation is the starting point for 
understanding norms, the research still treats contestation as an anomaly and tends to ‘salvage 
the established understanding of norms as shared understanding.’25 However, Niemann and 
Schillinger fail to consider the grammatical implications of the word contestation itself. 
‘Contestation’ refers to the process of contesting or ‘the act of arguing or disagreeing about 
something.’26 If an international norm is understood differently in various parts of the 
community, this does not equate to the norm being contested, it only becomes contested when 
an actor chooses to actively engage in a process of contestation by arguing or disagreeing 
with other actors in the community. It is important to stress that norms by nature are dynamic, 
 
19 Niemann, H. and Schillinger, H., ‘Contestation ‘all the way down’? The grammar of contestation in norm 
research’, Vol. 43 (1) (2016) Review of International Studies 29 – 49  
20 Johnstone, I., ‘Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument’, Vol. 14 (3) (2003) 
European Journal of International Law 437 – 480  
21 Acharya, A., ‘The R2P and norm diffusion: Towards a framework of norm circulation’, Vol. 5 (4) (2013) 
Global Responsibility to Protect 466 – 479 as cited by Bloomfield, A. op. cit. at note 6 
22 Wiener, A., ‘Contested Compliance: Interventions on the normative structure of world politics’, Vol. 10 (2) 
(2004) European Journal of International Relations 189 – 234 as cited by Bloomfield, A. op. cit. at note 6 
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid.  
25 Niemann, H. and Schillinger, H. op. cit. at note X 
26 ‘Contestation’. Cambridge Dictionary Online https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/contestation 
accessed on 13th July 2020  
12 
 
Finnemore and Hollis summarise this well providing that ‘every time actors follow a norm, 
they interpret it. They have to decide what it means and what behaviour it requires in the 
particular context at hand. Each interpretation, each episode of conformity with a norm (or 
failure to conform) accretes: it adds to and shapes the collective expectations of the group 
about what behaviour is appropriate (or not).’27 Niemann and Schillinger fail to recognise the 
fluidity of norms and instead suppose that an alternative understanding or interpretation of a 
norm is equal to the act of disagreeing with it. Thus, the present study rejects their findings 
and uses Wiener’s definition which accepts that normative contestation refers to the practice 
of engaging in normative discourse. 
 
2.1.2 - Normative Contestation and influential theories 
 
 As previously mentioned, the first body of literature on norms sought to demonstrate 
the existence and importance of norms in the international system and paid little attention to 
processes of contestation. Finnemore and Sikkink introduced the role of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ 
and the scholarship followed suit,28 remaining largely silent on the other roles played by 
actors in the international system. It was not until Bloomfield’s typology of roles that an 
emphasis was placed on the importance of analysing the other actors driving normative 
change.29 His work highlights the fact that not all norms are accepted by a community and 
instead face resistance from ‘norm antripreneurs’.30 The study builds on the research of Bob 
who sought to correct the liberal bias in the normative literature and found that ‘actors in 
norm contestation processes couldn’t be easily distinguished from one another with reference 
to their favoured tactics and strategies.’31 This particular point is of central importance to the 
following thesis which seeks to analyse the range of techniques and practices adopted by 
actors who engage in normative discourse. Whilst the various practices used by each state 
under study will be compared and analysed, the purpose of the research is to understand how 
these actors use their position and shape the common understanding of what is deemed to be 
legitimate behaviour. The research seeks to avoid categorising actors based on their 
geographical location or political views and to instead find similarities and differences 
 
27 Finnemore, M. and Hollis, D., ‘Constructing Norms for Global Cybersecurity’, Vol. 110 (3) (2016) The 
American Journal of International Law 425 – 479  
28 Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. op. cit. at note 2 
29 Bloomfield, A. op. cit. at note 6 
30 Ibid.  
31 Bob, C. The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012) as cited by Bloomfield, A. op. cit. at note 6 
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between each actor’s approach to contesting norms. As Bob demonstrates in his research, the 
common assumption that western norm makers lead the way for non-western norm takers is 
biased. The assumption that ‘the enlightened west’ lead, whilst ‘the rest’ eagerly follow suit 
without voicing their own interests, is flawed. He proves that all actors are ‘rival 
entrepreneurs’ within warring networks who are often indistinguishable from one another.32  
 
Dichotomous divisions that suggest ‘the west vs the rest’ oversimplify the complex 
processes of normative contestation which typically involve a vast array of actors, each trying 
to make their own mark. Bloomfield argues that an actor can adopt any role when contesting 
norms, both sides ‘typically coalition-build with a wide range of like-minded actors; they 
forum shop or create; they suborn members of the opposing coalition; and they engage in 
fierce ad hominem smear-attacks.’33 He introduces the role of norm antripreneurs and creates 
a spectrum of the various roles an actor might adopt in processes of norm contestation. The 
spectrum ranges from norm entrepreneur to norm antripreneur and includes two additional 
roles which he calls the ‘competitive entrepreneur’ and ‘creative register’.34 By setting out the 
various roles an actor can adopt he highlighted the possible tactical and strategic practices 
which might serve as an advantage for each actor. For example, within the UNSC, the veto 
power assigned to the permanent five gives them considerable strategic advantages, this 
allows antripreneurs to block action and prevent precedents from accumulating.35 The study 
marks a change from the typical classification of actors within studies of normative change 
and highlights the similarities between actors who engage in normative discourse. The 
following thesis also seeks to emphasise the fact that all five actors under study are in the 
same privileged position, as members of the UNSC, and are thus able to adopt any of the 
above roles. However, as the analysis will reveal, the processes of legitimacy will determine 
whether one actor has more or less success than another, when adopting certain practices. 
Whilst Bloomfield does provide a much-needed analysis of the possible tac-tics norm 
antripreneurs might employ, the research is silent on the process of legitimacy and how it 
plays a role in the contestation of norms.  
 
 
32 Ibid.  
33 Bloomfield, A. op. cit. at note 6 
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid.  
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Justificatory discourse can be analysed to determine both the existence of norms and 
the existence of contestation. If an actor seeks to convince others that their actions are norm-
conforming they will justify those actions in conformance with the existing normative 
framework. In the following research study this process of justification falls into the first 
category of legitimacy, that of legitimation practices. Sandholtz and Stiles recognise this 
process of justification, ‘this is the world of normative discourse, where payoffs depend on 
making persuasive arguments fitting situations to norms and precedents.’36 They comment on 
the lack of attention paid to normative contestation in the literature and developed a model 
which can be used to explain the importance of normative contestation at each stage of a 
norms existence. Their model highlights the cyclical nature of norms and links actions to 
disputes, disputes to arguments, and arguments to normative change.37 The study is useful in 
that it acknowledges the processes of legitimation whilst also indicating a number of features 
which increase the likelihood of actor’s arguments being accepted. These include 
communicative power, whether the arguments are grounded in foundational norms, and 
whether there is precedent.38 These features are useful for studying the rhetorical practices of 
actors seeking to legitimise their own actions and words. If an actor seeks to persuade others, 
then references to these foundational norms and existing precedent will of course strengthen 
their arguments and increase the chances of these actions being deemed as legitimate. The 
analysis section will thus revisit these features and determine how frequently such features 
are relied upon.  
 
  When an actor justifies their actions, they are seeking to persuade others to accept 
their actions as legitimate. Normative contestation cannot be understood without paying 
attention to these justificatory practices and subsequent legitimacy judgements. One of the 
few studies which explicitly mentions the key role played by legitimacy is Jones’ research on 
China’s challenge to liberal norms.39 Her contribution is particularly relevant to the following 
study as she focuses on the processes by which norms can be changed, what roles actors 
might play in that process, what tools actors can use to create change and also whether certain 
factors make it easier or more difficult to implement change. But of central importance is the 
recognition of legitimacy as a tool for change: 
 
36 Sandholtz, W. and Stiles, K. op. cit. at note 3 
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid.  




…by seeking to change the status of a norm as being legitimate and by changing the 
collective understanding of the group they thereby delegitimise an existing norm and 
legitimise a new norm.40 
 
The study identifies three roles which can be adopted by states: norm entrepreneurship, 
persistent objection and ad hoc objection which seem to slightly simplify the possible roles an 
actor might adopt when contesting norms.41 The spectrum provided by Bloomfield better 
recognises the range of roles and the possibility of switching roles throughout processes of 
normative change. What is of greater interest are the tools discussed which can be used by 
actors to effectuate change. She lists the following tools: reinterpretation, which includes 
reframing existing debates and using legitimacy to change the accepted status quo; 
introducing new issues to existing contestations; and introducing new populations or creating 
new institutions, both of which seek to recruit like-minded actors to support existing 
debates.42 Out of the above tools only the first two relate to the rhetoric used by actors 
engaging in normative discourse, although existence of the second two can be seen in the 
UNSC meetings which discuss Syria as new actors are introduced to debates and new forums 
are created to discuss the same issues. Whilst Jones recognises that there is a role played by 
legitimacy, it does not feature in the work as a prominent part. The following study seeks to 
do this by emphasising the fact that each actor is constantly seeking legitimation whilst 
simultaneously trying to delegitimise others.  
 
 By engaging in justificatory discourse, actors adopt narratives which match their own 
understanding of the norms or explain why the norms do not currently fit their desired 
purpose. These narratives reflect an actor’s interpretation of the relevant norms, framed in 
their own style, filled with emotions or at times even insults. The practice can be compared to 
storytelling, or perhaps even mythmaking, if the narrative is constructed to create the 
impression that something is not the way it seems to be on the surface. One of the few studies 
that have recognised the importance of these practices is Booth Walling’s All Necessary 
Measures: The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention,43 which analyses the stories 
 
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid.  
43 Booth Walling, C. op. cit. at note 7 
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and storytelling in the UNSC. She argues that it is only possible to understand why states 
engage in intervention by analysing these narratives and further demonstrates how discourse 
is constructed in the UNSC. By analysing the discourse from a number of conflicts, she 
identifies three types of stories which actors might tell. 1. Intentional – the conflict is 
characterised as one-sided, there is a clear victim and a perpetrator, forcible action more 
likely, 2. Inadvertent – the conflict is two-sided, termed as ‘moral equivalency’ because there 
are multiple parties involved, 3. Complex – the conflict is multifaceted and complex, factors 
beyond human control and thus unsolvable, forcible action unlikely.44 The categories are 
useful in that they can help one to understand why intervention did or did not take place in a 
particular conflict.  
 
In a review of her book, Hillebrecht applied the model to the Syrian Civil War, 
throughout which some actors in the UNSC have presented a narrative in which Assad is the 
clear perpetrator, whereas others claimed that Assad is on the defensive and is fighting 
against forces which threaten the sovereignty of the state.45 As predicted by Booth Walling, if 
two narratives collide and actors in the UNSC do not share the same opinion, then the result 
will be inaction. This model carries far more weight that the wealth of scholarship that seeks 
to explain the lack of intervention in Syria by focusing solely on the contradiction of the 
norms surrounding the use of force and those of sovereignty. Whilst some scholars have 
accepted that the likelihood of humanitarian intervention ought to be considered on a case by 
case basis, there has been little effort to take a closer look at the discourse of each case and 
seek to explain what makes it successful or unsuccessful. For this reason, Booth Walling’s 
study is perhaps the most important for the following research and, as will be seen, can help 
one to understand why the UNSC has been unable to make substantial progress.    
 
Whilst the contributions made by these studies are of significance, the processes of 
legitimacy have been largely ignored. By recognising the central role legitimacy plays in 
normative contestation, the following study will build upon these works and strengthen the 
collective understanding of normative contestation by highlighting the importance of 
discourse and the rhetorical practices adopted by actors who are seeking to influence the 
 
44 Ibid.  
45 Hillebrecht, C., ‘Review: Reshaping the Idea of Humanitarian Intervention: Norms, Causal Stories, and the 
Use of Force’, Vol. 36 (2) (2014) The Johns Hopkins University Press 488 – 492  
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normative conversation. The next section introduces the concept of legitimacy and outlines 
the relevant theories surrounding it. 
 
2.2 - Legitimacy 
2.2.1 - Conceptualising Legitimation Practices and Legitimacy Judgements 
 
 The current study accepts that ‘legitimacy is a social status that can adhere to an actor 
or an action: it involves being recognised as good, proper, or commendable by a group of 
others.’46 This definition accepts that legitimacy can be applied to actions, not just actors, 
which is crucial for the following thesis. Previous definitions often exclude this possibility 
providing more simply that ‘legitimacy is the recognition of the right to govern;’47 or ‘an 
actor’s normative belief that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed;’48 or ‘a property of a 
rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those 
addressed…’49 The concept of legitimacy is multifaceted and the multitude of definitions are 
not inaccurate as such, they simply do not suit the purposes of this study. The two types of 
legitimacy discussed here are interlinked; analysing the following quote by Finnemore and 
Sikkink allows one to dissect the two processes, ‘because norms by definition embody a 
quality of ‘oughtness’ and shared moral assessment, norms prompt justification for action and 
leave an extensive trail of communication…’50 The ‘justification for action’ offered by actors 
refers to the practice of legitimating and the ‘shared moral assessment’ refers to legitimacy 
judgements. 
 
The legitimation practices of actors are those steps or measures taken by them to 
justify their action. When an actor is seeking to legitimise an action, for example the use of 
force, they do not want a legal judgement on the appropriateness of using force and what the 
implications of it might be, they already know this. Instead they are seeking political 
reassurance that their action, namely military intervention, will be accepted by other actors 
 
46 Coleman, K., International Organisations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of International Legitimacy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Chapter 2 
47 Coicaud, J., Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution of the Study of Political Right and Political 
Responsibility, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Chapter 1 
48 Hurd, I., After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2007) 
49 Franck, T., The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) Chapter 1 
50 Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. op. cit. at note 2 
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without costly consequences.51 Thus that actor will spend time and resources seeking to 
convince other actors that their proposed action, or perhaps an act already committed, is 
worthy of the collective stamp of approval. Claude describes this as a burden, providing that 
‘power holders are burdened, like other human beings, by the necessity of satisfying their 
own consciences… [they] require some basis for convincing themselves of the rightness of 
their position.’52 Within the international community this political judgement can be more 
weighty than a legal judgement, it is like a status which actors compete to obtain. Hurd writes 
extensively about legitimation practices and the role of symbols in international relations;53 
he recognised the symbolic power of institutions like the UNSC, and examined how ‘the 
legitimacy of an institution can be transferred to any other actor authorised to deploy its 
symbols.’54 These types of practices, where actors use justifications and words to associate 
themselves with other legitimate things, are to be understood, in the following thesis, as 
legitimation practices.  
 
International legitimacy judgements are the collective judgements that actors seek 
when engaging in legitimation. Coleman conceptualises international legitimacy judgements 
as ‘judgements of acceptability independent of legal strictures.’55 If states conclude that an 
action violated existing practice, but that ‘the action merely applies the existing rule to new 
circumstances, they will be inclined to accept it as legitimate.’56 Collective legitimacy 
judgements are political judgements, not legal ones, this distinction is crucial. Such 
judgements have ‘a political function, [are] sought for political reasons, exercised by political 
organs through the operation of a political process, and production of political results.’57 
Thus, to a certain extent, international legitimacy judgements are subjective evaluations of a 
given situation. They require ‘the interpretation of prevailing general rules in light of a 
specific situation,’58 but are inevitably shaped by the subjective beliefs, cultural biases and 
even political orientation of a given actor. As illustrated above, legitimation practices and 
 
51 Voeten, E., ‘The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force’, Vol. 
59 (3) (2005) International Organization 527 – 557  
52 Claude, I. ‘Collective Legitimisation as a Political Function of the United Nations’, Vol. 20 (3) (1966) 
International Organisation 367 – 379  
53 Hurd, I., ‘Legitimacy, Power and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council’, Vol. 8 (1) (2002) Global 
Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organisations 35 – 51; Hurd, I., op. cit. at note 48 
54 Ibid.  
55 Coleman, K. op. cit. at note 46 
56 Ibid. 
57 Claude, I. op. cit. at note 52 
58 Coleman, K. op. cit. at note 46 
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legitimacy judgements are linked; actors seek to obtain approval from their peers by 
providing justifications for their actions, their peers then form a judgement which either 
accepts or rejects the action as legitimate. Further consideration of these concepts is possible 
by analysing their development in the literature. 
 
2.2.2 - The Importance of Legitimacy 
 
It is impossible to understand the workings of international law, norms and 
institutions without considering the practices of legitimacy and legitimation. The following 
section will demonstrate the importance of legitimacy by considering the following: why 
legitimacy matters, how justifications and symbols are used in legitimation practices, how the 
legitimacy of international law and international organisations can be appropriated, the gap 
between law and legitimacy in collective judgements and finally how legitimacy can 
demonstrate the strength of the international community.  
 
Legitimacy helps one to understand why actors join international institutions and 
follow international rules. It is useful to remember that membership in an international 
organisation, like the UN, actually decreases state sovereignty. One is better able to 
understand why an actor might choose to sacrifice part of their sovereignty by analysing the 
benefits they receive in return, in particular the status of legitimacy. Claude highlights the 
role of legitimacy in the international system and argues that politics itself is not merely a 
struggle for power, but also a contest over legitimacy.59 He further recognises the role of 
international organisations and most notably the UN as a ‘custodian’ or gatekeeper to 
collective legitimacy.60 As previously discussed, actors or statesmen recognise the substantial 
gains involved in gaining legitimacy for their actions and thus put in substantial effort to gain 
access to that legitimacy.  
 
Franck summarises this by comparing the rules of the international system to the 
house rules of a membership club:  
 
 
59 Claude, I. op. cit. at note 52 
60 Ibid.  
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Membership in the club confers a desirable status, with socially recognised privileges 
and duties and it is the desire to be a member of the club, to benefit by the status of 
membership, that is the ultimate motivator of conformist behaviour… In short, it is the 
legitimacy of the rules which conduces to their being respected.61 
 
The comparison is useful in that it helps one to understand why states might choose to follow 
rules which they may not necessarily agree with. Members of the international community 
might be encouraged to comply with the rules because they want to be seen as responsible 
players, although this does not always mean that they want to be responsible players. States 
feel compelled to justify their actions, so as to avoid being labelled as rulebreakers, and will 
attempt to do so using appropriate grounds, other than national interests, so that the 
international community might recognise their actions as legitimate.62 It is recognised that 
this practice might ‘encourage behaviour based upon calculation of what the political 
situation will permit rather than consideration of what the principles of order require.’63 
Whether this is a positive development or not, it is a reality and reflects the challenges 
involved in developing rules and structures for a diverse international community that often 
does not share common goals and interests.  
 
Actors seeking legitimacy will offer justifications for their actions and may even 
make efforts to associate their actions with pre-existing legitimate things, such as the UN or 
international law. In many cases, when a state offers justifications for its behaviour, it is 
because the state is aware of the likely reaction against that behaviour. Why would a state 
feel the need to justify behaviour that they know is legal and legitimate? A useful example to 
illustrate this process, cited by Finnemore and Sikkink,64 are the US justifications offered to 
explain why the US felt compelled to continue using land mines in South Korea. Such 
behaviour demonstrates the recognition of the emerging norm against such land mines, 
without which there would be no reason to mention, explain or justify the use of land mines 
in Korea at all.65 Another commonly cited example are the justifications offered by Bush 
before and after the intervention in Iraq. He spent considerable time and resources seeking 
 
61 Franck, T. op. cit. at note 49, Chapter 2 
62 Schachter, O., International Law in Theory and Practice (RdC, 1985), as cited by, Johnstone, I., op. cit. at 
note X  
63 Claude, I. op cit. at note 52 
64 Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. op. cit. at note 2 
65 Ibid.  
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legitimacy for the intervention,66 efforts which were largely unsuccessful as he failed to 
persuade a large proportion of the international community of the necessity to take such 
forceful action. If, however, the international community do accept these justifications, the 
actor will likely have provided a convincing case as to why their actions ought to be deemed 
legitimate. However, if the international community denounce the actions, the actor will 
likely suffer a loss of legitimacy, as did Bush following the intervention in Iraq.  
 
 International organisations and the symbols associated with them carry legitimacy that 
is desirable for actors to obtain or be associated with. Actors recognise that gaining access to 
a legitimate symbol can increase their own legitimacy; this might lead to their actions having 
a greater chance of being accepted by the international community, which in turn means that 
they have a greater opportunity to influence change. Hurd demonstrates how states compete 
to have access to the symbols associated with the UNSC which include: membership in the 
UNSC, setting the agenda for meetings and the label of UN peacekeeping.67 The research is 
unique in that he recognises the almost trademark-like status of UN symbols which actors 
seek to be associated with. For example, he discusses Russia’s involvement in Moldova and 
Tajikistan in the early 1990’s, both of which started without UNSC approval.  
 
The Russian army, in Moldova, painted their helmets blue and, in Tajikistan, their 
vehicles white in what he describes as ‘a way to win local and international support for the 
idea that the mission was one of ‘peacekeeping.’’68 This can also explain why Bush sought 
UNSC approval before conducting a military intervention in Iraq; this process has often been 
compared to laundering money.69 An actor knows that the desired act, committed alone, is 
likely to generate disapproval from the international community, but when run through an 
international organisation it generates a ‘veneer of multilateralism,’70 and thus decreases the 
political costs which would result from acting alone. Hurd describes the use of these symbols 
and institutions as a ‘fig leaf’ because they hide the true intentions of a state, instead 
emphasising either their ‘peacekeeping efforts’ or even the ‘multilateral nature’ of their 
 
66 Ginty, R., ‘Post-Legitimacy and post-legitimisation: a convergence of Western and non-Western 
intervention’, Vol 19 (3) (2019) Conflict, Security and Development 251 – 255  
67 Hurd, I. op. cit. at note 48 
68 In official UN peacekeeping missions, the peacekeepers have white vans and blue helmets. Ibid. 
69 Abbott, K and Snidal, D., ‘Why States act through Formal International Organisations’, Vol. 42 (1) (1998) 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 3 – 32; Hurd, I. op. cit. at note 48 
70 Coleman, K. op. cit. at note 46 
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actions.71 Whether such efforts to conceal inappropriate actions are successful, lies in the 
hands of the international community who express their judgement.   
 
 The desire to be associated with the correct interpretation and application of 
international law provides more evidence of attempts by actors to increase their own 
legitimacy or even attempt to delegitimise others. Despite the fact that the UNSC is a political 
forum, members acting inside the UNSC engage in legal argumentation. The fact that the 
UNSC has delivered verdicts, which are traditionally left to the decision of a court, has at 
times caused controversy. For example, sanctions are applied to governments or individuals 
without providing those targeted with the right to a fair trial or the presumption of innocence, 
the principle that one is innocent until proven guilty.72 Hurd demonstrates that the UNSC 
sanctions targeted against Libya in the 1990s were challenged, thus questioning the 
legitimacy of the sanctions themselves and even threatening the legitimacy of the UN.73 The 
research highlighted the successful attempt made by Libya to reframe the existing rules and 
norms of the international community so as to undermine the legitimacy of the sanctions 
regime and prove that the sponsors of the sanctions had acted illegitimately.74 The study 
illustrates how each actor frames the dispute and highlights the subjective nature of the rules 
themselves. It also provides evidence of the storytelling actors engage in when seeking to win 
the support and perhaps even sympathy of others.  
 
Another study published, which is of particular interest, is Deplano’s book titled The 
Strategic Use of International Law by the United Nations Security Council.75 She recognises 
that the majority of UNSC resolutions address issues in Africa and the Middle East and 
sought to study the selection bias of UNSC actions. She assumed that the more international 
instruments are cited in a resolution, the more unbiased the resolution. However, the results 
of her study proved the exact opposite. She found that the resolutions concerning Africa 
actually contained more references to international law, which suggests that states might 
utilise international law as a ‘justification for perpetuating the selection bias’.76 The study 
 
71 Hurd, I. op. cit. at note 48 
72 Johnstone, I. ‘Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council: Bringing down the Deliberative 
Deficit’, Vol. 102 (2) (2008) American Journal of International Law 275 – 308  
73 Hurd, I. op. cit. at note 48 
74 Ibid.  
75 Deplano, R., The Strategic Use of International Law by the United Nations Security Council (Cham: Springer 
International Publishing, 2015) 
76 Ibid.  
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sheds light on how members of the UNSC might justify their own behaviour by connecting 
that behaviour to existing law and principles which already hold legitimacy. 
 
The fact that legitimacy judgements are political judgements, not legal ones, creates a 
tension between law and legitimacy which inevitably causes problems within the 
international community. Recent years have seen the gap between law and legitimacy widen 
with the first notable case being that of Kosovo in the late 1990s, whereby the military 
intervention led by NATO was deemed (by some) to be illegal but legitimate. The UNSC and 
the scholarly community remain divided over the crisis which has created an uncomfortable 
precedent and continues to challenge the international community. Finnemore provides that 
such disagreements over the use of force are in fact the norm, not the exception, and are ‘best 
understood as disagreements within a multilateral framework, not rejection of it.’77 These 
disagreements do not necessarily mean that the international system is not functioning, or that 
the norms themselves are doomed to fail. Johnstone argues that the ‘variegated nature’ of the 
arguments and justifications posed following the Kosovo crisis highlight the strength of the 
international system and can be interpreted as indirect evidence of an interpretive community 
associated with UNSC practice.78 As previously discussed, these justifications and arguments 
presented by states, demonstrate the existence of norms and the inevitable feature of 
contestation which they embody. In relation to the Kosovo crisis: 
 
…the mere fact that legal arguments were advanced by all members, including the 
most powerful, suggests that the normative framework provided by the Charter and 
subsequent developments is sufficiently robust to warrant an effort to justify positions 
on legal grounds.79 
 
Such a reading of the Kosovo case allows one to appreciate the existence and strength of the 
international rules and emphasises the crucial role of the UNSC as ‘a principal forum for 
seeking consensus on bitterly contested norms,’80 or in the words of Claude, as the guardian 
of collective legitimacy. 
 
 
77 Finnemore, M. ‘Fights about rules: The Role of Efficacy and Power in Changing Multilateralism’, Vol. 31 
(2005) Review of International Studies 187 – 206  
78 Johnstone, I. (2003) op. cit. at note X  
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid.  
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 Evidence of justificatory discourse and contestation amongst actors arguing over the 
correct course of action proves the existence of a normative community and demonstrates 
that multiple actors are interested in engaging with that community. One might argue that 
cases like Kosovo and Iraq, both instances of intervention without a UNSC mandate, hardly 
proved the strength of the rules which are supposed to prevent the use of force being used 
outside the framework of the UN Charter. However, despite the fact that both interventions 
went ahead, the failure to win support from the UNSC in advance significantly increased both 
the military and diplomatic cost of each intervention.81 Howard and Dayal take this even 
further by arguing that the Kosovo intervention actually changed China’s approach to 
peacekeeping within the UNSC.82 Before Kosovo, China generally refrained from 
peacekeeping votes preferring to abstain, however, in 1999 China started to support more 
resolutions which authorised UN peacekeeping missions. They explained this change in tack 
by arguing that being side-lined by NATO hurt China’s status as a power in the UNSC and 
so, in order to ensure the UNSC remained at the centre of decisions surrounding the use of 
force, they shifted their stance and started to work with the other permanent members.83 
Whilst controversial interventions challenge the normative community, they certainly do not 
disprove the existence of the community.  
 
The above examples illustrate the importance of legitimacy in cases which challenge 
the existing norms surrounding the use of force. Whilst an actor might obtain support for one 
action which oversteps the mark, the likelihood of effectuating long-term normative change is 
limited by the subjective response of the community who choose whether to accept or reject 
this new interpretation. Within the international community actors have access to different 
forums, networks and even rules which they can appropriate to gain legitimacy and 
implement change. Linking the concept of normative contestation to that of legitimacy allows 
one to understand the rhetorical tricks and techniques used by actors within these forums to 





81 Hurd, I. op. cit. at note 48 
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2.2.3 - Rhetoric, Emotions and Legitimation strategies 
 
 The rhetorical strategies used by actors when contesting norms have received little 
attention in the literature on norms. However, the literature on power and organizations does 
recognise the role played by discursive practices and thus will be briefly considered. It is now 
understood that actors in organizations carry out legitimacy work, defined by Lefsrud, Graves 
and Phillips as ‘purposeful activity to shape others’ evaluation of something as ‘desirable, 
proper or appropriate,’’84 which ‘involves attempts at persuasion in order to influence an 
individual’s beliefs, attitudes, or behaviours.’85 In the current study, legitimacy work falls 
into the category of legitimation practices. A number of studies which explore legitimacy 
work are of particular interest and relevance, each of which will be briefly outlined.  
 
 Early studies on legitimacy work focused on the discourse of actors and sought to 
identify the different legitimation strategies they rely on. Vaara, Tienari and Laurila 
conducted a study which sought to uncover how certain processes of organizational 
phenomena or change are legitimated in society.86 Whilst the subject of the study is of less 
relevance (they analysed the media coverage of a pulp and paper merger), the discursive 
legitimation strategies which were identified are of interest. The five legitimating strategies 
are: 1) normalization – references to normal behaviour, 2) authorization – references to 
authority, 3) rationalization – reference to the utility or function of action, 4) moralization – 
references to specific values, 5) narrativization – telling a story, often dramatizing.87 As will 
be seen in the analysis section, these strategies are useful for categorising types of discourse 
used by actors. Another similar study by Suddaby and Greenwood underlines the importance 
of distinguishing between discourse and rhetoric. Rhetorical strategies are defined as ‘the 
deliberate use of persuasive language to legitimate or resist an innovation by constructing 
congruence or incongruence among attitudes of the innovation,’88 the emphasis being on 
persuasion. They identify five theorizations of change, understood as linguistic devices used 
by actors to manipulate an innovation. These are: ontological, historical, teleological, 
 
84 Lefsrud, L. and others, ‘’Giant Toxic Lakes you can See from Space’: A Theory of Multimodal Messages and 
Emotion in Legitimacy work’, Vol. 41 (8) (2020) Organization Studies 1055 – 1078  
85 Huy, Q. ‘Emotions in strategic organization: Opportunities for impactful research’, Vol. 10 (3) (2012) 
Strategic Organization 240 – 247 as cited by, Ibid.  
86 Vaara, E. and others, ‘Pulp and Paper Fiction: On the Discursive Legitimation of Global Industrial 
Restructuring’, Vol. 27 (6) (2006) Organization Studies 789 – 810  
87 Ibid.  
88 Suddaby, R. and Greenwood, R. ‘Rhetorical Strategies of Legitimacy’, Vol. 50 (1) (2016) Administrative 
science quarterly 25 – 67 
26 
 
cosmological and value-based.89 Out of these, just two are of relevance to the current study, 
historical and value-based practices, both of which appeal to tradition and morals. 
 
 When analysing discursive practices, the study of emotions and how actors seek to 
influence others by manipulating their emotions has received far less attention. The influence 
of emotions on normative power was only recently recognised in a study conducted by 
Moisander, Hirsto and Fahy which explored the relationship between power and emotions in 
institutional work. 90 Three rhetorical strategies were identified which can be used to fuel, 
enable and constrain action by manipulating the emotions which underpin legitimacy 
judgements.91 These strategies are: 1) eclipsing emotions – stifling resistance by rendering 
legitimacy concerns insignificant, 2) diverting emotions – invalidating emotion-based moral 
concerns, 3) invoking emotions – mobilising emotions with ethnical reasoning.92 This study 
is unique in that it recognises the role played by emotions in legitimacy judgements and 
normative discourse, highlighting the ways in which an actor might manipulate the emotions 
of others. The authors differentiate between two types of emotions: moral emotions, such as 
pride and shame, and affective emotions, such as love, hate, trust and respect.93 As will be 
seen in the analysis section, the P5 make use of such rhetorical techniques which manipulate 
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3 - The Use of Force, Syria and Normative Contestation 
3.1 - The Use of Force: The UN Charter and Customary International Law 
 
The use of force in the international system is regulated by both treaty law and 
customary international law and is based on the legal norm which prohibits the threat or use 
of force. Whilst the principle itself is a norm, it is considered to be of fundamental 
importance and accepted as a peremptory norm or jus cogens.94 The principle is codified in 
the UN Charter under Art 2(4) which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of another state.95 Within the Charter, there are only two 
legally recognised exceptions, both of which can be found in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
The first is found in Article 42 which provides that the UNSC can ‘authorise the use of force 
where the existence of a threat to international peace and security has been determined.’96 
The second exception is Article 51 which provides that ‘nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs 
against a member of the UN.’97  
 
Regulating the use of force has always proved to be a challenge for the international 
community and is further complicated by the principle of non-intervention. Intervention is 
one of the most disputed words within the international community, in the words of Hafner, 
‘Hardly any other expression used in international law is as vague, blurred, controversial and 
disputed as the term ‘intervention.’’98 In legal discourse, intervention is understood as 
military action which is not requested or approved by state authorities, the focus being on the 
consent.99 By contrast, in political discourse, intervention can refer to the act of influencing 
another state’s domestic political balance.100 Thus one can see the difficulties involved in 
applying these principles.   
 
94 ‘Jus cogens (or ius cogens) is a latin phrase that literally means “compelling law.” It designates norms from 
which no derogation is permitted by way of particular agreements.’ Oxford Bibliographies,  
https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0124.xml 
accessed on 2nd July 2020 
95 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, Art 2(4) 
96 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, Art 42 
97 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, Art 51 
98 Hafner, G. Sub-group on Intervention by Invitation, Preliminary Report, 26 July 2007, Yearbook of the 
Institute of International Law, Santiago Session 226, as cited by Jamnejad, M. and Wood, M., ‘The Principle of 
Non-Intervention’, Vol. 22 (2) (2009) Leiden Journal of International Law 345 – 381  





The UN Charter is an international treaty and thus the above articles are, without a 
doubt, part of international law. However, the interpretation of the articles and of what 
constitutes a ‘threat to international peace and security’ is not set out in writing, which means 
the application of these articles are subject to interpretation and thus constantly susceptible to 
change. The ‘rules’ used by states to apply these articles are customary law. Customary 
international law can be understood as norms which ‘emanate from state practice founded in 
opinio juris, in other words from regular patterns of behaviour that states believe to be 
enjoined by law.’ 101 It is important to distinguish international law from national law, the 
latter of which can be enforced through the legal system of a state. By contrast, international 
law is not enforceable as such; there is not an institution which has the power to compel 
states to act in line with international law. It is thus impossible to understand the workings of 
international law and the UNSC without considering the practices of legitimacy and 
legitimation. International legitimacy judgements reflect a common understanding of the 
rules and contribute to the development of new and existing ones. The difference between a 
successful and an unsuccessful attempt to change customary international law by precedent is 
therefore not found in the legality of the action but in its acceptance among other states – in 
other words its legitimacy.’102 
 
The subsequent development of humanitarian intervention and the R2P concept have 
inevitably caused tensions within the international community as states attempt to reshape the 
boundaries of acceptable behaviour surrounding intervention. Since the end of the Cold War 
the threshold for establishing threats to international peace and security has been lowered to 
include instances of human suffering, the overthrow of a democratic government, state 
failure, refugee movements and ethnic cleansing.103 Most of which are classified under 
humanitarian intervention, a concept which appeared in the 19th Century and refers to a 
military intervention, justified by the protection of ‘humanitarian standards.’104 A second 
concept, which appeared in response to the failures of humanitarian intervention and in the 
aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and Kosovo killings, is called the R2P. The intervention 
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in Libya and subsequent deadlock over Syria has caused many to question the future of the 
R2P. 
  
3.2 - The Syrian Civil War 
 
In 2011, in the wake of the Arab Spring which toppled Tunisia and Egypt’s 
presidents, protests started with the hope of bringing the Arab Spring into Syria. Protests 
initially erupted in response to the treatment of 15 boys who were tortured for graffiti which 
showed support to the Arab Spring.105 Protestors calling for reform were brutally suppressed 
by the government and by 2012 confrontations had escalated between the Assad government 
and various opposition groups. The conflict has attracted a wealth of foreign actors that 
include the US, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey who support opposition groups, and Iran and 
Russia who support the Syrian government.106 The terrorist group ISIS flourished as the 
conflict went on and in 2015 the US, the UK and France with support from regional partners 
including Turkey and Saudi Arabia ‘expanded their air campaign in Iraq to include Syria.’107 
Russia also in 2015, upon invitation from the Syrian government, started to conduct airstrikes 
in response to the threat of terrorism. Later in 2017, the US took direct military action against 
the Syrian government providing few, if any, legal justifications. The situation on the ground 
is far more complicated than the above summary and includes a number of other actors 
causing many to label the conflict as a playground of proxy wars, most notably between the 
US and Russia although recent developments have put Russia and Turkey into an equally 
compromising position. Throughout the conflict more than 470,000 people have died, an 
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3.3 - Normative Contestation, Syria and the UNSC 
 
It is not possible to assess the situation in Syria without first taking into consideration 
the NATO intervention in Libya which occurred shortly before the conflict in Syria was 
tabled on the UNSC’s agenda. In 2011, Resolution 1973/2011, which authorised a no-fly 
zone over Libya, marked the first time the UNSC had authorised the use of force for 
humanitarian purposes against the wishes of a functioning state. A number of UNSC 
members were hesitant about passing the resolution: Germany noted concerns about being 
drawn into a region-wide conflict, India shared similar concerns to Russia with regard to the 
lack of clarity over the enforcement of the measures, Brazil expressed concerns that the 
resolution could result in more harm than good and China noted that all of these questions 
and concerns had not been clarified.109 However, despite these reservations they chose to 
abstain from voting, instead of casting a veto which would have blocked the resolution from 
being adopted, likely due to the severity of the escalating crisis in Libya. The manner in 
which the resolution was implemented, which saw a shift from the protection of civilians to 
supporting rebel opposition groups and regime change, has led members of the UNSC to 
remain cautious of both western-led interventions and the R2P concept itself which became 
associated with regime change.  
 
When the situation in Syria was first brought to the UNSC in 2011 the NATO 
intervention had just started in Libya. Even prior to the capture and killing of Gaddafi, both 
China and Russia were cynical of the NATO intervention which, in their eyes, overstepped 
the provisions of Resolution 1973/2011. Throughout the conflict the permanent five members 
of the UNSC have been unable to pass a resolution which enables forceful, decisive 
multilateral action. It is recognised that the situation in Syria is a threat to international peace 
and security, the problem stems from different beliefs amongst the P5 as to how this problem 
should be addressed. The perceived failure of some states, to even recognise the Syrian 
government from the start of the conflict, gave China and Russia reasons to be paranoid about 
the application of R2P, which could be abused, as in Libya, to effectuate regime change. 
These concerns were voiced by casting vetoes and criticising proposed resolutions for failing 
to adhere to the principles of neutrality and impartiality.  
 
 
109 UNSC, S/PV.6498, 17th March 2011 
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As previously mentioned, a number of scholars have already used Syria as a case 
study to analyse the changing path of the rules and to highlight how various actors are trying 
to make their own contribution. Tocci demonstrates that ‘all major international actors 
contributed to the ongoing normative conversation about how and when to respond to mass 
atrocities’ in response to the crises in Libya and Syria;110 Ralph and Gifkins compare the 
number of successful resolutions related to Syria before and after a change of penholder, 
highlighting the tensions amongst the P5;111 Odeyemi argues that the BRICS countries are an 
important condition for the success of the R2P concept;112 and Fung writes exclusively about 
China’s influence throughout the conflict and how China is engaging in normative 
contestation.113 There are plenty of other scholarly articles which discuss similar questions in 
Syria,114 thus the following thesis will not focus on whether or not there is normative 
contestation in Syria. That is already a given. The focus will be on how actors use their 
rhetoric to influence change and to justify their own actions and thus gain legitimacy. By 
analysing the discourse for persuasive techniques and devices used by states, instead of 
searching for the existence of normative contestation and attempting to predict the future of 
those norms, the research will contribute to the field in a new way. By analysing the different 
actor’s approaches to normative contestation and how they seek legitimacy within the UNSC 












110 Tocci, N. op. cit. at note 11 
111 Ralph, J. and Gifkins, J. ‘The Purpose of UNSC Practice: Contesting Competence Claims in the Normative 
Context Created by the Responsibility to Protect’, Vol. 23 (3) (2017) European Journal of International 
Relations 630 – 653  
112 Odeyemi, C. op. cit. at note 12 
113 Fung, C. op. cit. at note 12 
114 Allison, R., ‘Russia and Syria: explaining alignment with a regime in crisis’, Vol. 89 (4) (2013) International 
Affairs 795 – 823; Stahn, C. op. cit. at note 11; Scharf, M. and others, op. cit. at note 107; Morris, J., ‘Libya and 
Syria: R2P and the spectre of the swinging pendulum’, Vol. 89 (5) (2013) International Affairs 1265 – 1283  
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4 - Methodology  
 
This study seeks to re-emphasise the importance of legitimacy when studying 
normative contestation. The rhetorical techniques and patterns of behaviour used by actors 
seeking to gain legitimacy for their proposed actions was the focus of the research. Using 
empirical analysis, the discourse of the five permanent members of the UNSC was explored 
to reveal the tactical practices used by actors to legitimise their words, persuade others and 
shape the normative conversation. The following research questions were explored: 
 
1. How do actors legitimise themselves? 
2. How do actors try to influence the legitimacy judgements of others? 
 
In order to answer these questions, I conducted a small-n comparative study of the five 
permanent members of the UNSC. Using inductive coding and discourse analysis, I analysed 
ten years of UNSC meeting records which discuss the Syrian civil war. The following chapter 
outlines this process by detailing: why this dataset was chosen for the following study, what 
information is required to understand this dataset, the methods chosen for collecting research, 
how the research was organised and finally whether there are any limitations of this study. 
 
4.1 - Dataset 
 
The UNSC is particularly well-suited to this study because members of the 
organisation regularly contest norms and their application in the course of its work. 
International norms are formed, shaped and debated in international organisations which 
makes them a suitable place for studying normative contestation. The UNSC has primary 
responsibility for maintaining international peace and security which, as previously 
discussed, involves interpreting some of the most contested norms of the international 
community. These norms are the prohibition of the use of force and the principle of non-
intervention, the interpretation and application of which have always been a challenge for the 
international community. Furthermore, as highlighted by Claude, the organisation has 
evolved and adopted the function of collective political legitimisation, the significance of 
which is recognised by states and statesmen alike.115 
 
115 Claude, I. op. cit. at note 52 
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The UNSC meeting records, which are recorded verbatim and made accessible online 
in English, provide an accurate record of each discussion which is necessary for discourse 
analysis. A common criticism of the UNSC is the lack of transparency because most of the 
negotiations take place away from the Chamber in meetings which are not recorded or made 
publicly available. The official meetings are usually comprised of pre-prepared speeches 
which have already been discussed behind closed doors. The orchestrated nature of UNSC 
meetings actually makes the data more interesting for this study as the pre-written speeches, 
edited and approved by the relevant foreign ministries or even state leaders, demonstrate the 
official position taken by a country on a particular issue. The speeches made by each member 
reflect the public position taken by each state and illustrate how each member would like the 
international community to view it. The pre-determined position presented by each actor 
allows for a polished overview of that actor’s opinion which is appropriately framed in their 
own understanding of the situation. This is desirable for the following thesis which seeks to 
uncover the rhetorical devices each actor uses to express their position on a given norm. 
 
The five permanent members of the UNSC are suitable research subjects because they 
each have the same amount of experience in the organisation and are familiar with its 
procedure and corporate behaviour. The composition of the UNSC, and in particular its 
permanent membership, is subject to much criticism for failing to accurately represent the 
international community. Aside from having the privilege of veto rights, they have an 
advantage over the non-permanent members because they know how the council functions, 
what is permissible, what is not permissible, and they have far more experience drafting 
speeches, resolutions and taking up the presidency. For the purposes of this study this makes 
them perfect research subjects since they are all aware of the corporate culture of the UNSC 
and have a shared understanding of what takes place during meetings. The particular 
approach each of them might take within the UNSC, whilst being guided by the formal rules 
of procedure, is of course influenced by the cultural norms of the state in question. But the 
one uniting feature, that of permanent membership, is what makes the study between these 
actors appropriate. Aside from this they do not share the same language, history, culture, 
ideology, foreign policy, etc. These factors will inevitably influence the research and might 
even shed some light on why each actor adopts certain rhetoric in challenging situations. 
 
 The Syrian Civil War is a suitable case study because it has lasted for over ten years 
and throughout this time the permanent members have, more often than not, failed to reach a 
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consensus. As previously mentioned, the conflict first appeared in the UNSC in April 2011 
and continues to be discussed today. Throughout the ten years the frequency of meetings 
which discuss Syria increased, yet progress within the UNSC remains limited. The ten years 
of meeting records which capture these encounters provide a useful resource for studying 
normative contestation. It is necessary to select a large sample of data so that patterns in 
behaviour and repeated actions can be recognised. The reason for choosing data which relates 
to such a serious conflict is because the purpose of the research is to capture the techniques 
used by actors to legitimise when they are contesting norms, thus it would be 
counterproductive to include additional meeting records which do not present a challenge to 
the UNSC. Because of the large amount of data between April 2011 and March 2020, every 
other month was used for the research. This provided a random sample of the dataset which 
also reflected the changing practices of the actors throughout the ten years. 
 
4.2 - Information about Dataset 
 
 Before analysing the text, it was necessary to understand the rules of procedure which 
guide the format for each meeting. The Provisional Rules of Procedure establish the working 
practices of the UNSC and detail the working methods that govern the meetings; it includes 
guidelines for the agenda, the conduct of business, the presidency, the participation of others, 
etc. The Provisional Rules have been amended on a number of occasions and the most recent 
version, found in Presidential Note 507 (S/2017/507)116, contains an exhaustive account of 
the updated practices. A number of articles are worth being mentioned as they contain 
important procedural points. Article 22 provides that participants are to deliver their 
statements in five minutes or less,117 this rule applies to both members and non-members and 
encourages members to express their opinions in a succinct way. Articles 49 and 50 
encourage interaction by suggesting speakers ‘direct their questions not only to the 
Secretariat, but also to other members,’118 and to ‘not discourage each other from taking the 
floor more than once.’119 Thus, when considering issues, the interaction between members is 
encouraged.  
 
116 United Nations Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council (30 August 2017, 
S/2017/507) at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2017_507.pdf  
117 Ibid. at Art 22 
118 Ibid. at Art 49 
119 Ibid. at Art 50 
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It is also worth mentioning that, as per Article 27 of the UN Charter, each member of 
the UNSC is entitled to one vote. For decisions to be passed on procedural matters there need 
to be nine affirmative votes, and for all other decisions there must be nine affirmative votes 
including the votes of all five permanent members. The final consideration refers to the 
minutes of the meetings. Each member of the UNSC is encouraged to submit, to the 
Secretariat, texts of their statement to facilitate the preparation of verbatim records.120 The 
verbatim record is provided to each member of the UNSC one day after the meeting for 
approval by each participating member; members are encouraged to submit corrections to the 
Secretariat if there are any mistakes.  
 
4.3 - Methods 
 
Before collecting my data, I carried out an extensive review of the literature which 
covered the study of norms in social constructivism, legitimacy in international relations and 
law, emotions, international organisations and specifically the UNSC and the Syrian Civil 
War. Initially I was interested in the justifications for intervention offered by states and how 
they differed from one another. As I became more familiar with the field, I realised that there 
were countless articles which discussed the justifications for the use of force, most of which 
were linked to the development of humanitarian intervention and the R2P. I realised that, 
whilst these studies sought to shed light on the processes of normative change, by analysing 
how justifications changed and developed over time, there was little attention being paid to 
how these changes actually took place in practice. The concept of legitimacy was rarely 
acknowledged in studies of normative contestation, despite the important role it plays in 
effectuating change in the normative environment. Thus the concepts of normative 
contestation and legitimacy were selected, the latter of which was divided into legitimation 
practices and legitimacy judgements. 
 
Following the literature review I uploaded my data, every even month of the UNSC 
meetings which discuss Syria, to the Qualitative Data Analysis Software package NVivo. In 
order to make the data more manageable I carried out the first layer of coding straight away 
using the following five nodes: UK, US, FR, RF, CH. I then used inductive coding to explore 
the rhetoric and behaviours of the five states under study. The following codes were created: 
 





References to other legitimate actors 
References to fundamental norms  
References to law and UNSC  
References to own commitment 
Use of facts/evidence 
Prescribed course of action 








Denying legitimacy to others 
Delegitimising institutions and actors 
References to illegitimate actions 








Historical reference points 
Quotes 
  
4.4 - Organisation of Research 
 
 The above data was grouped into ten separate categories, five for each research 
question, each of which will briefly be considered before a table is presented to demonstrate 
which codes were grouped under each category. 
 
1. Other legitimate things / other illegitimate things:  
 
The first category was the most obvious one because it draws on the work of Hurd, Deplano 
and Sandholtz and Stiles.121 As previously discussed, when legitimising oneself, actors 
recognise the political symbolism of other legitimate things including law, norms and 
international organisations. Likewise, they know that when seeking to delegitimise the words 
or actions of others, they would do well to target the actors themselves and discredit their 
legitimacy. 
 
121 Hurd, I. op. cit. at note 53; Hurd, I. op. cit. at note 48; Deplano, R. op. cit. at note 75; Sandholtz, W. and 





The second category was inspired by Marwell and Schmitt's typology of compliance-gaining 
strategies. The article notes that an actor might try ‘to increase his own attractiveness to the 
target, by building up his own expertise, to increase the persuasiveness of his arguments.’122 
The following study adopted this category but assumes a relativist understanding of the term, 
implying that there is not one absolute truth but instead truths which a particular actor or 
culture happen to believe. The category was created to capture the self-professed expertise 
each actor seeks credit for and how they go about presenting this expertise to others. 
 
3. Spirit of the UNSC 
 
The third category was created to capture all those references made about the values and 
purpose of the UNSC including suggestions about how permanent members ought to behave. 
This category also captures the references made to improper procedural practices which were 




This category is perhaps one of the largest but possibly one of the most important. As 
previously mentioned, studies of the emotional practices of actors contesting norms are 
limited, despite the fact that all actors engage in emotional rhetoric. The category sought to 
capture the descriptive practices used by actors, the visual imagery, the sarcasm and the 
insults which fly between members. 
 
5. History and Memory  
 
The final category was created to capture the references made to historical precedents, 




122 Marwell, G. and Schmitt, D. ‘Dimensions of Compliance-Gaining Behaviour: An Empirical Analysis’, Vol. 
30 (4) (1967) American Sociological Association 350 – 364  
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Legitimation Practices Legitimacy Judgements 
Other legitimate things 
- References to Fundamental Norms 
- References to Law and UNSC  
- References to other International 
Actors 
Other illegitimate things 
- Denying Legitimacy to others 
- Delegitimising Institutions 
- Illegitimate Actions 
Expertise 
- References to own commitment 
- Using Facts/Evidence 
- Prescribed course of action 
Expertise 
- Right side of history argument 
- Justifications for 
intervention/counterterrorism 
Spirit of the UNSC 
- Responsibility as P5 
Spirit of the UNSC 
- Blaming  
- Procedural points 
- The use of the veto 
Emotions 
- Personal stories 





- Rhetorical questions 
History and Memory 
- Historical reference points 
History and Memory 





4.5 - Limitations 
 
 There are a couple of limitations to the study, each of which will briefly be 
considered. The first is the fact that it was conducted in English, whilst only two of the five 
countries under study are native English speaking. As previously mentioned, the UNSC Rules 
of Procedure request members of the Council to provide copies of their speeches in both 
English and their native language, so as to facilitate the process of making minutes. Despite 
the fact that each member is able to provide a translated copy of their speech, the text may 
have lost parts of its original meaning or intent when it was translated into English. In this 
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sense, the data might not be 100% accurate, but it is the closest option and thus suitable for 
the purposes of this study. 
 
Furthermore, the study assumes that norms are only contested, vocally, within the 
UNSC, which is not the case. Norms can be contested anywhere and everywhere, in 
telephone conversations between political leaders, in actions taken by a state and of course in 
other international forums. As previously mentioned, the current study focuses on the UNSC 
due to its prominence in the international system and due to the fact that it deals with some of 
the most contested norms. The purpose of this choice was to analyse the behaviour of the five 
states who have the most influence within the organisation. It would not have been possible, 
in the current timeframe, to consider all words and actions of each state. Thus the UNSC 
meetings were selected to ensure consistency and transparency of the data. 
 
 It is also important to consider other factors which likely influence the relationship 
between members in the UNSC. The study does not take into account the political leaders of 
each member state, each of whom have their own view of international politics. Furthermore, 
throughout the dataset, the leaders in each of the five countries have changed. A change in 
leader undoubtedly results in a change of foreign policy and possible fluctuations in relations 
with other international players. It may also prompt a change of ambassador in the UNSC in 
order to reflect this new foreign policy stance. Again, the personalities and styles of the 
individual ambassadors were not taken into consideration due to limitations in time and 
space. However, a leadership style analysis of either the UNSC representatives or of the 
respective political leaders would undoubtedly provide for an interesting study.  
 
 The final consideration, which is particularly important, is to note that each actor is 
likely to have been influenced by pre-existing relations with, or interests in, Syria. For 
example, France is a former colonial power and thus has a decades long relationship with the 
Syrian state. Russia and Syria have had strong relations since the Cold War, Russia has a 
naval facility in Tartus and Syria purchase arms from Russia. And of course, there are oil 
fields in Syria, which happen to currently be protected by the US, who are rumoured to have 
signed a secret deal with Kurdish authorities to develop and export the region’s crude oil.123 
 
123 Seligman, L. and Lefebvre, B. ‘Little-known US form secures deal for Syrian oil’, (POLITICO, 8th June 




This list of interests each actor has in Syria is not exhaustive, but it demonstrates some of the 



































5 - Analysis  
 
The two concepts of legitimacy under consideration, legitimation practices and 
legitimacy judgements, are closely interlinked, hence the research questions will be addressed 
simultaneously. The analysis is divided into three parts, each of which captures one of the 
key findings of the research process. The first part challenges the common assumption that 
the P5 take on different roles within the UNSC, often portrayed as norm-makers and norm-
takers (or revisionists). The analysis shows that each member of the P5 are using the UNSC 
in exactly the same way to promote their own interests by constructing a (dis)information 
campaign which presents themself and other likeminded actors as worthy of legitimate 
support, whilst, often aggressively, delegitimising others who do not share their interests. The 
second part looks specifically at the norms and values being promoted by each actor in the 
UNSC and argues that UNSC activity is shaped by the rhetorical approach adopted by the 
members of the P5. A moralistic, humanitarian approach has been lobbied, primarily by the 
US, by adopting emotional rhetoric, with graphic, descriptive imagery and visual realia. 
Attempts by other actors to defend the (former) status quo, which seeks to protect the 
principle of non-intervention, are presented with references to law, established norms and 
practice. The third part argues that the above approach is determined by the importance each 
member of the P5 places in the UNSC. The tone used by each actor and the importance they 
place in respecting the UN Charter and international law reflects their own view of the 
organisation and how much value they place in their membership.  
 
5.1 - Narrativization Strategies  
 
The P5 are contesting the limits of the exceptions to Art 2(4) of the UN Charter which 
prohibits the use of force. To simplify their positions, the P3 are willing to intervene in Syria 
in the name of human rights and wish to see a change of leader, whereas the P2 are against an 
international intervention and wish to protect the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and non-intervention. Both sides understand that they must convince the international 
community why their proposed course of action deserves support. Thus, each side embark on 
a targeted (dis)information campaign seeking both to legitimise their own approach whilst 
delegitimising the approach of the other. This competition, or fight, for legitimacy defines the 
approach taken by each actor throughout the conflict. The legitimation strategies theorised by 
Vaara, Tienari and Laurila, in particular references to authority, morals and narrativization, 
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are particularly useful for understanding the rhetoric of the P5 and will thus be considered.124 
The analysis will proceed as follows: what narratives are used by actors to justify their 
proposed course of action, how actors rely on references to authority, morals and history to 
legitimise their narratives, and finally how actors justify their expertise on the conflict. 
 
In order to drive forward their own interests and shape the normative conversation, 
each member of the P5 has constructed a narrative which compliments their proposed course 
of action. As per Booth Walling’s study, these narratives define the conflict as either one-
sided, two-sided or multifaceted, and identify victims and perpetrators.125 Narrativization, as 
previously discussed, is one of the legitimation strategies theorised by Vaara, Tienari and 
Laurila who further provided that such practices were often dramatized.126 Evidence of 
dramatizing will be presented as various actors involved in the conflict are cast as heroic 
protagonists or evil antagonists. Such narratives are used by actors as tools to advance their 
interests by framing the conflict in a way that compliments those interests. These narratives 
can be summarised as follows: the P3 from the very start of the conflict targeted Assad and 
the Syrian authorities, later including both Russia and Iran. Russia’s campaign targets the 
opposition in Syria, the P3, the media and even the UN; and China’s campaign, which is far 
less accusatory than the others, targets the P3 and Western-led interventions.  
 
In order to promote these campaigns, actors engage in rhetoric which seeks to 
legitimise their own approach whilst delegitimising the approach adopted by those who are 
opposed to it. As a result, the activity inside the UNSC resembles that discussed by Hurd 
when considering the Libyan Sanctions in the 1990s.127 When contesting norms, in this case 
the limits of Art 2(4) of the UN Charter, an actor knows all too well that they can target the 
legitimacy of ‘the other’. Thus, Bob’s finding that all actors are ‘rival entrepreneurs within 
warring networks’ is wholly appropriate.128 The purpose of targeting the legitimacy of other 
actors is to discredit them and their reputation as a responsible international player. States 
care about their legitimacy ‘because they are part of an international community from which 
 
124 Vaara, E. and others, op. cit. at note 86 
125 Booth Walling, C. op. cit. at note 7 
126 Vaara, E. and others, op. cit. at note 86 
127 Hurd, I. op. cit. at note 48; Hurd, I. op. cit. at note 53 
128 Bob, C. The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012) as cited by Bloomfield, A. op. cit. at note 6  
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they derive their rights, obligations and authorities to act in legitimately sanctioned ways.’129 
If an actor is deemed to be illegitimate by a proportion of the international community, they 
also suffer a loss of sovereignty, since one of the components of sovereignty is international 
recognition. The P5 recognise that they can use their prominent position to smear the 
credibility of others and taint their international reputation.  
 
 The P3, initially led by France, have consistently rejected the legitimacy of the Syrian 
authorities and led the information campaign against Assad, who is the main antagonist in 
their frame. France even noted in the very first UNSC meeting about the events in Syria that 
the Syrian authorities ‘have lost all legitimacy by murdering their own people;’130 marking 
the start of the campaign against Assad and the Syrian authorities. Delegitimising Assad and 
the Syrian authorities makes the case for an intervention to protect citizens from human rights 
abuses more digestible to an audience that is sensitive to western-led interventions and 
regime change. Throughout the dataset the P3 regularly refer to the Syrian government as 
‘the regime’ which can be understood as a reflection of their unwillingness to recognise it as 
the legitimate government. Even as reconstruction efforts started in Syria, the P3 assured the 
UNSC that ‘assistance with reconstruction will be foreseeable only when an irreversible, 
credible and inclusive political transition has begun,’131 and that ‘there will be no legitimacy 
for the regime.’132 The fact that this campaign was waged by the P3, who have dominated 
UNSC policy since the end of the Cold War,133 makes it more damaging for the Syrian 
authorities, due to the significant communicative power and influence the P3 have. They 
regularly back one another up in meetings and very rarely display different voting practices 
with regards to Syria, thus outnumbering the P2 within the P5. The effect of their campaign is 
a significant loss of sovereignty and international reputation. 
 
 
129 Barnett, M. ‘Bringing in the New World Order: Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the United Nations’, Vol. 48 (4) 
(1997) World Politics 526 – 551  
130 Statement by Ambassador Gérard Araud, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, UNSC, 
S/PV.6627, 4th October 2011 
131 Statement by Ambassador François Delattre, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, 
UNSC, S/PV.8384, 29th October 2018 
132 Statement by Mr. Rodney Hunter, Political Coordinator United States Mission to the United Nations, UNSC 
S/P.8434, 20th December 2018 
133 Krisch, N. ‘The Security Council and the Great Powers’ in Lowe, V. and others (ed), The United Nations 




Whilst the main focus of the P3 campaign is Assad, the legitimacy of Russia is also 
targeted as Russian interests run counter to their own. Within the UNSC, Russia actively 
defends the legitimacy of the Syrian authorities, urging for a respectful approach whilst 
pointing out that ‘terms such as ‘the Syrian regime’… is contrary to all the relevant Security 
Council resolutions, which speak only of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic.’134 As 
a result, the P3 target the relationship between Russia and the Syrian authorities, who in their 
eyes have no legitimacy, claiming that ‘Al-Assad [has] humiliate[d] Russia in the eyes of the 
world… [and that] if Russia is to restore its credibility, it will need to join us…’135 Such 
statements perhaps exaggerate the divisions which are portrayed as being the whole world 
against Assad, Russia and Iran. Occasionally the P3 also criticise China for casting a veto, but 
generally most comments are targeted at Russia who, as will be shown, is most vocal about 
opposing their interests.  
 
 The P2 lead an anti-regime change campaign which they know will engage those in 
the international community opposed to western-led interventions. Whilst they regularly 
display similar voting practices to one another, their approach in the UNSC is not the same, 
summarised well by Snetkov and Lanteigne as ‘The Loud Dissenter and its Cautious 
Partner.’136 Russia, the Loud Dissenter, is the main antripreneur pushing back against the 
interests of the P3, who are dubbed as ‘the humanitarian troika’ who ‘after destroying Libya 
and considering that a great success… turned on Syria.’137 Following the US intervention in 
2017, Russia pounced on the illegality of the action which constituted ‘a gross violation of 
Syrian sovereignty… in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international 
law.’138 Almost all speeches made by Russia following the US intervention, target the US for 
its ‘illegal military venture’ and continued ‘US illegal occupation.’ The purpose of 
highlighting these illegal practices is of course to delegitimise the US, the main antagonist in 
Russia’s narrative, and to demonstrate to the international community that they are pursuing 
their own interests, with no respect for international law. It is worth noting, that Russia was 
quick to point out the legality of their own intervention which was ‘in response to the 
 
134 Statement by Ambassador Vladimir Safronkov, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation 
to the United Nations, UNSC, S/PV.8384, 29th October 2018 
135 Statement by Ambassador Matthew Rycroft, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United 
Nations, UNSC, S/PV.7915, 5th April 2017 
136 Snetkov, A. and Lanteigne, M. op. cit. at note 12 
137 Statement by Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United 
Nations, UNSC, S/PV.7785, 8th October 2016 
138 Statement by Ambassador Vasily Nebenzia, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the 
United Nations, UNSC, S/PV.8236, 17th April 2018 
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invitation from the legitimate government of the Syrian Arab Republic.’139 They place 
particular emphasis on the fact that their own intervention is legal whilst the US intervention 
is illegal, seeking to demonstrate to the international community that they are the true 
followers of international law. However, as previously discussed, the growing gap between 
law and legitimacy means that it is possible for an intervention to be deemed legitimate, 
despite its illegality.  
 
This growing gap between law and legitimacy is a particularly unfavourable 
development for Russia. In an institution like the UN, which throughout its history has been 
dominated by the US, a decision based solely on legitimacy is particularly worrisome. As 
proved in the Syrian conflict, despite the illegality of the US intervention in Syria, both the 
UK and France immediately voiced their support for the action, deeming it to be a legitimate 
response. Due to the huge influence the P3 have on the institution and its collective 
legitimacy judgements, the voices of both Russia and China, who are vocally opposed to such 
military interventions, are drowned out. If an intervention can be deemed legitimate, based on 
the collective judgement of the majority, then in their eyes, the system that they are seeking 
to protect is partially undermined. Thus, for Russia, the legitimacy of the UN is a double-
edged sword. As will be discussed shortly, the status of the UN is used, when needed, to 
legitimise Russian processes which are lacking international support or recognition. But, on 
the other hand, when the UN is led by the interests of the US or is simply not acting in the 
interests of Russia, then UN legitimacy can be a threat.  
 
In an effort to push back against US influence and western interests, the UN is also 
targeted in Russia’s narrative. As a result, the Russian campaign at times presents a 
contradiction. Whilst Russia wants to protect the legitimacy of the UNSC and ensure it 
remains the primary institution responsible for responding to threats to international peace 
and security, it is also wary of the influence the P3 have on the direction of UN activity and is 
suspicious of any actions they lead within the SC. UN agencies are accused of ‘poor practice 
of investigation’140 and UN staff in Syria ‘are in total turmoil.’141 Such statements are 
intended to expose the UN as unreliable, untrustworthy and not capable of handling the crisis 
 
139 Statement by Mr. Sergei Lavrov, Foreign Minister of Russia, S/PV.7588, 18th December 2015 
140 Statement by Ambassador Vladimir Safronkov, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation 
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in Syria, whilst presenting Russia as an actor with specialised knowledge of the conflict. 
Accusations are also made against the Syrian opposition, the Special Envoy, the Joint 
Investigative Mechanism, the White Helmets and the media. These allegations are textbook 
examples of attempts, by an actor, to drive forward their own version of events and damage 
the reputation of anyone that disagrees with them. Before considering the campaign voiced 
by China, these tensions between primarily Russia, the UK and the US will be presented. The 
following table displays the number of times each actor cited other members of the P5.  
 
Table 1 – Word frequency of one another 
 SUBJECT 









China X 2 24 3 6 
France 1 X 68 7 19 
Russia 6 10 X 16 141 
UK 12 13 234 X 31 
US 17 9 320 8 X 
 
Interestingly, despite the fact that France initially led the campaign against Assad, 
Russia do not target them and instead accuse the US of leading the crusade. As previously 
discussed, Russia regularly criticises the US for its actions in Syria and for ‘violating every 
norm of international law’ when deciding to take direct forceful action.142 The emphasis on 
the US reflects the pre-existing relations between the two countries and also demonstrates 
Russia’s desire to challenge US hegemony and dominance in the international system. 
Likewise, both the UK and the US regularly cite Russia which is both because of Russia’s 
active role in the conflict since 2015, and because they are criticising Russia’s actions inside 
and outside the UNSC.  
 
By contrast, as evidenced in the figures, China rarely makes direct comments about 
other members of the P5. They push back against the practice of western-led interventions, 
albeit in an indirect manner, by casting their veto and defending their position with references 
to authority, such as law and norms. China is far less aggressive and accusatory towards other 
 
142 Statement by Ambassador Vasily Nebenzia, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the 
United Nations, UNSC, S/PV.8073, 24th October 2017 
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actors and instead consistently reminds the group of the ‘need to avoid politicisation of 
humanitarian issues.’143 This approach reflects their view on international relations as a 
whole, which is often presented by Xi Jinping as ‘the correct view on justice and interests.’144 
As will be discussed in greater detail in the third part of the analysis, the formal tone and 
legalistic approach, as opposed to an emotional approach, to the UNSC is one way that China 
can demonstrate that it is a responsible player who is thus worthy of respect and great power 
status. Having explored each of the narratives of the P5, the strategies employed by them to 
legitimise their approach will be explored. 
 
References to authority are made by each of the P5 as they handpick facts and figures 
which support their information campaign. The practice of reinterpretation as a tool for 
influencing change (as per Jones),145 is used to reframe the issues to compliment the narrative 
being projected by each actor. As previously discussed, actors seeking legitimacy must 
provide justifications for their actions, in order to prove that they are playing by the rules and 
not merely promoting their own interests. Despite the fact that each actor is using a different 
source of information, they all nonetheless rely on some kind of authority to justify their 
narrative. Whilst the P3 cite statistics which rely on UN information sources (such as the 
World Health Organisation, the Joint Investigative Mechanism, etc.) and internationally 
recognised organisations (such as Human Rights Watch); Russia rely on their close 
relationship with Assad and the Syrian authorities to illustrate the ‘true picture on the 
ground.’ Russia assures the UNSC that their own version of events is based on an 
‘unpoliticised and impartial approach and in line with the guiding principles of the United 
Nations…’,146 whilst arguing that the P3 sources of information are based on propaganda and 
are biased. Whilst it is difficult to ascertain the facts of the Syrian conflict, since it is the facts 
themselves which are the main subject of disagreement amongst the P5, it is not difficult to 
point out the contradictions between each actors version of the facts. Distorting the facts of a 
conflict, to suit the interests of an actor, is one way that actors may try to legitimise their 
 
143 Statement by Ambassador Li Baodong, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, UNSC, 
S/PV.6826, 30th August 2012 
144 Finnish Institute of International Affairs, The Security Strategies of the US, China, Russia and the EU (FIIA 
Report, 2018) 
145 Jones, C. op. cit. at note 5 
146 Statement by Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United 
Nations, UNSC, S/PV.7116, 22nd February 2014 
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actions, termed by Franck as ‘the tribute scofflaw governments pay to [the] international legal 
obligations they violate.’147  
 
Actors also reference the authority of international law and fundamental norms to 
persuade the international community of their legitimate intentions. As previously discussed, 
when contesting norms, references to foundational norms strengthen an actor’s argument (as 
per Sandholtz and Stiles).148 The arguments made by the P5 are justified by the need to 
protect these foundational norms, but the difference between each actor’s approach depends 
on how much weight they assign to a particular norm. For example, as will be discussed in 
more detail in the second part of the analysis, the P3 are motivated by the protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and thus prioritise these norms over those 
surrounding sovereignty and territorial integrity. By contrast, the P2 are motivated by the 
protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the prohibition of the use of force in 
international relations and therefore prioritise these norms. Each member regularly refers to 
these norms to justify their proposed course of action, knowing they will engage those in the 
international community who share their interests in protecting them. The P5 understand that, 
without justifying their behaviour with references to international law and established norms, 
they are unlikely to convince the international community that they are acting legitimately. 
Without such references, they are likely to be accused of abusing the UNSC to promote their 
own national interests. 
 
As is perhaps clear at this stage of the analysis, China stands out from the other 
members of the P5 for its alternative approach to the UNSC. China relies on references to law 
and order to justify all statements made in the UNSC and is committed to protecting the 
principles of international law. China regularly urges the members of the UNSC to follow its 
lead in treating the UNSC as a ‘solemn forum…not a place where groundless attacks can be 
made against the serious positions of other countries.’149 All statements are carefully couched 
in legal terms and established norms, a rhetorical practice which is used both to legitimise 
and delegitimise. China offers an approach which engages all those who are also sceptical of 
the US and their actions in the UNSC. They prioritise international law and seek to protect 
 
147 Franck, T. ‘The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age of Power 
Disequilibrium’, Vol. 100 (1) (2006) The American Journal of International Law 88 - 106 
148 Sandholtz, W. and Stiles, K. op. cit. at note 3 
149 Statement by Ambassador Liu Jieyi, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, UNSC, 
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the international system from abuse and domination by the US. The third part of the analysis 
will return to this point and explain why such an approach is adopted by China. 
 
Another type of authority used by the P5 to legitimise their position are references to 
other authoritative actors. Such references both strengthen their claim to multilateralism and 
support their claim to legitimacy by proving that the interests being promoted are shared by 
other members of the international community. For example, the UK, when supporting a draft 
submitted by Morocco, vocally confirmed that the draft already ‘had support from the vast 
majority of Council members and had the backing of the Arab League.’150 On another 
occasion Russia expressed thanks to ‘our partners, especially Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa – the BRICS States – for supporting our text.’151 The practice can be compared 
to name dropping, defined as ‘the studied but seemingly casual mention of prominent persons 
as associates done to impress others.’152 It demonstrates to the international community that 
their interests are multilateral in nature as they are shared by other legitimate players. 
Likewise, the legitimacy of the UN can also be appropriated to sugar coat non-UN processes 
or institutions.  
 
As previously discussed, the UN and the symbols associated with it carry legitimacy 
which, in the words of Hurd, has developed an almost trademark-like status.153 Thus when 
the Astana Process was launched by Russia, Turkey and Iran without the participation of the 
UNSC, they still relied on the UN to legitimise the process. They immediately invoked the 
Geneva Communique and Resolution 2254/2015, UN documents which detail conditions for 
a political transition in Syria, and in subsequent UNSC meetings, Russia regularly cites the 
input of UN officials. Both of which can be interpreted as a way to associate the process with 
the pre-established legitimacy of the UN. In one example, following a summit in Sochi, the 
Russian Ambassador emphasised the contribution of Staffan de Mistura, UN Syria Envoy, 
whose ‘participation on behalf of the United Nations lent the event particular significance.’154 
The statement was made in the face of scepticism as to the credibility and appropriateness of 
 
150 Statement by Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United 
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151 Statement by Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN, 
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the Astana Process which undermines the UN as primary body responsible for responding to 
the conflict. Such comments demonstrate the vulnerability of the sponsor and their arguments 
who, without the UN and its legitimacy, would have a hard time convincing the international 
community to support the process. 
 
The next legitimation strategy to be considered is references to morals, which also 
includes the emotional practices used by actors to delegitimise others. As theorised by Vaara, 
Tienari and Laurila, moralization is used primarily as a delegitimisation strategy.155 
Throughout the dataset, members express feelings of regret,156 disappointment,157 outrage,158 
and disgust;159 they talk of being appalled by others’ decisions;160 label others responses in 
the UNSC as grotesque;161 and the UK even urge Russia to re-find its moral compass.162 Such 
statements display the highly emotional responses of the members of the UNSC and how they 
react when others do not share their interests. By considering Moisander, Hirsto and Fahy’s 
rhetorical strategies of emotion work it is possible to further unpack the purpose of using 
such rhetoric.163 Of relevance is the third strategy, evoking emotions, which operates in two 
ways:  
 
1. Creating a sense of duty by mobilizing shame for unmet obligations 
2. Evoking pride and a sense of belonging to facilitate positive legitimacy judgements164 
 
In this case of course it is the first of these two practices which is being used. Such comments 
are intended to arouse feelings of shame, guilt and embarrassment, all of which are 
categorised as moral emotions in the study.  
 
155 Vaara, W. and others, op. cit. at note 86 
156 Statement by Ambassador Li Baodong, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, UNSC, 
S/PV.6627, 4th October 2011 
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UNSC, S/PV.6627, 4th October 2011; Statement by Ambassador Susan Rice, Permanent Representative of the 
United States to the United Nations, UNSC, S/PV.6826, 30th August 2012  
159 Statement by Ambassador Susan Rice, Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, 
UNSC, S/PV.6711, 4th February 2012 
160 Statement by Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United 
Nations, UNSC, S/PV.6711, 4th February 2012 
161 Statement by Ambassador Samantha Power, Permanent Representative of the United States to the United 
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Ambassador to the United Nations for Special Political Affairs, UNSC, S/PV.7785, 8th October 2016 
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Whilst evoking such emotions in the target, the rhetoric is also designed to 
demonstrate that they have somehow failed to meet certain standards or expectations and thus 
are unworthy of legitimacy. On a number of occasions, Russia refuses to engage in such 
confrontations and instead makes references to God, providing that God will be the judge of 
those who have chosen the wrong path. ‘Who is guilty? Who is to blame? I think that 
ultimately God will tell us;’165 ‘As for the insulting remarks about Russia, China, and other 
States, we leave them to their consciences and may God be their judge.’166 Such comments 
also utilise this strategy of arousing shame whilst simultaneously assuming the moral high 
ground by refusing to engage in such rhetoric.  
 
Other practices which are used, primarily by the UK, the US and Russia, to evoke 
emotions, are sarcasm and humour. The UK and the US regularly use this strategy to 
delegitimise Russia, by mocking the statements made by the Russian ambassador. Such 
practices are particularly common following a veto, a failed draft resolution or an especially 
provocative speech. For example, on one occasion the UK respond to an allegation made by 
Russia by sarcastically asking, ‘…for the record, then, the answer is that we should trust the 
information from Russian intelligence about strikes on rebel-held territory, but when the 
information is provided by independent experts of the United Nations, we should not trust 
it.’167 Likewise, the US regularly use sarcasm to challenge and even mock Russia: ‘Does 
Russia believe that all the children who are being killed in eastern Aleppo are themselves 
members of Al-Qaida? Is that what happens – that you come out of the womb and you are an 
Al-Qaida member, right from the beginning?’168 Such comments make up part of the 
campaign against Russia and serve to delegitimise Russia by adopting moralistic rhetoric 
which is designed to cast Russia in a shameful light. They also form part of the approach 
adopted by the UK and the US in the UNSC, which as will be discussed in the following part 
of the analysis, utilises emotions to promote a moralistic approach to UNSC activity. 
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Russia also engages in these emotional practices, albeit less frequently than the UK 
and the US. Whilst Russia usually adopts a legalistic tone in the UNSC, emotional rhetoric is 
used to question and ridicule the actions of others. Thus the P3 are christened as ‘the 
humanitarian troika’ and are mocked for their position as ‘self-styled champions of 
humanity.’169 Both nicknames being fuelled by the frustration felt by Russia at western-led 
humanitarian interventions. On one occasion, they directly respond to an appeal made by the 
UK to put an end to the conflict and remark, ‘Indeed, how about it? How about immediately 
putting an end to supporting various thugs around the world – terrorists, extremists and all the 
other amateurs exacerbating the situation in one country or another? How about putting an 
end to interfering in the affairs of other sovereign states? Just give up these colonial customs 
and leave the world in peace.’170 The rhetorical strategy, which utilises rhetorical questions, is 
less emotional than statements made by the UK and the US, but it still serves the same 
purpose. Comments like these do not stop at the UK and the US. In another example, Russia 
criticises Mr O-Brien, Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency 
Relief Coordinator: ‘If we needed to be preached to, we would go to church. If we wanted to 
hear poetry, we would go to a theatre.’171 The remark can be interpreted as part of the 
campaign to delegitimise the UN by targeting those working for the organisation. Each of the 
examples presented demonstrates the campaign led by Russia which targets the legitimacy of 
those who do not share their interests.  
 
Before considering how actors justify their expertise when voicing their opinion, there 
is one last legitimation strategy to consider: historical references. This final legitimation 
strategy was recognised as a theorization for change by Suddaby and Greenwood who, as 
previously discussed, developed five theorizations for change.172 Within the current dataset, 
this rhetorical strategy, which relies on references to collective memories, is used to evoke an 
emotional response which encourages action based on necessity. It works by connecting 
current issues to memories of tragic historical occurrences which have scarred the collective 
memory of the international community. The purpose is to remind the audience of their 
responsibilities as members of the international community to prevent such events from 
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happening again. By evoking emotions in the audience, actors are influencing the legitimacy 
judgements made by that audience. France, who as previously discussed were the first to 
drive forward an anti-Assad campaign, regularly makes references to shared memories of 
humanitarian crises: ‘…memories of the bloody massacres of the civilian population in Syria 
in the 1980s, in particular in Hama, are too painful for the international community to silently 
stand by…’173 ‘Aleppo is to Syria what Sarajevo was to Bosnia and Guernica was to 
Spain…’174 They can be interpreted as part of the drive by France to lead the way in the fight 
against abusers of human rights. 
 
Such narratives are also adopted by other members of the P5 to remind the 
international community of their collective responsibility to prevent history from repeating 
itself. In the words of the UK ambassador ‘our peoples have said ‘never again’ – among 
others, starting with the First World War battlefields, in Ethiopia, in Manchuria and in 
Saddam Hussein’s attacks on Iran and Iraqi Kurds.’175 Even China uses such memories to 
justify its own stance and expertise, providing that ‘China has itself been a victim of the use 
of chemical weapons by other States. The Chinese people are more justified than any other 
party to express their opposition to the use of chemical weapons.’176 Historical references are 
particularly powerful tools to use when seeking to protect the norms which prohibit the use of 
chemical weapons as they provoke such tragic and disturbing memories. On several 
occasions, the recent poisoning of Sergei Skripal, former Russian intelligence officer and 
double agent, is cited by the UK and France as a consequence of the failure of the UNSC to 
respond forcefully to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. The purpose of making such 
connections is to remind the international community that, without effective mechanisms in 
place to deter such practices, ‘the world is a far more dangerous place…’177 and thus forceful 
action must be taken fast to defend the international system. 
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 The recent memory of the Libyan intervention and the consequences of it, which are 
still ongoing, are a regular reference point for the P2 to use as they push back against the P3 
drive to intervene in the conflict. These references both delegitimise western-led 
interventions whilst also engaging all those in the international community that were critical 
of the NATO-led intervention in Libya. Knowing that it could be cited as precedent, both 
Russia and China regularly make references to the negative consequences of the intervention 
to delegitimise it, whilst simultaneously using their veto to block draft resolutions and 
prevent precedent from accumulating. Such regular references are made to ensure the 
intervention is not used as a model for the R2P concept, something both members are 
particularly paranoid about. They are clear that ‘the situation in Syria cannot be considered in 
the Council separately from the Libyan experience.’178 Even China, who in general makes 
less accusatory statements than the other members of the P5, speaks with a particularly 
confrontational tone about the recent Western-led interventions. ‘How did the situation in 
Syria come about, and how did the problems that other countries in the Middle East are 
dealing with reach the point where they are today? Where did they begin, and why? What has 
been the role played by the various countries concerned? The historical record is very 
clear.’179 These regular references to previous interventions contribute to the campaign 
against regime change and are used to justify and legitimise the position adopted by both 
Russia and China.  
 
 Another practice used by the P3 is to put pressure on ‘the other’ and urge them to join 
the ‘right side of history.’ This narrative simplifies the possible responses of the international 
community down to two choices: the right and the wrong side of history. The narrative 
assumes that the speaker themself is already acting on the right side of history, based on their 
own judgement, and that anyone acting separately from them is, of course, on the wrong side 
of history and thus unworthy of legitimacy. Such practices are also used to evoke emotions 
and create feelings of shame by putting pressure on those who do not share their interests. 
The P3 regularly pressure the P2, providing that ‘History will judge harshly those countries 
that have prevented the Council from offering its support…’180 and that ‘…the Syrian people 
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– and the world – will remember who was on the wrong side of history and who was on the 
side of the Syrian people.’181 Such arguments, as Ralph and Gifkens discuss in their article, 
suggest that the P3 were interested in gaining the moral high ground and so, instead of 
engaging in compromise and choosing a response which might be more acceptable to the 
other players, continued to press forward with their preferred response. A response which 
advocates for Assad to go, knowing full well it would shine a negative light on those who 
respond by continuously casting their vetoes.182 The practice ties in with the emotional 
strategy often used by the P3 (to be discussed in more detail in the next part) whereby 
moralistic rhetoric is adopted in the UNSC in an effort to encourage a moralistic approach to 
UNSC activity.  
 
 The final point to consider in this part of the analysis are the justifications used by 
actors to demonstrate their expertise in responding to the conflict. All of the above examples, 
which illustrate the rhetorical strategies used by actors to legitimise their narratives, are 
justified by the actors self-professed expertise and generous contributions made towards the 
cause. Throughout the conflict each member of the P5 regularly declare how much money 
they have spent or how much assistance they have provided to those affected by the conflict. 
This can be interpreted as a way to further insert themselves, legitimately, into the 
conversation as an important contributor. In the face of inaction by the UNSC, each actor is 
determined to prove that they are making additional efforts towards resolving the conflict 
whilst also helping those affected by the crisis. Such statements form part of the 
narrativization strategy and define the actor responsible for them as heroic and worthy of 
support. The P5 are quick to point out that they deserve a part to play in the discussion 
because of their contributions: ‘as the leading donor of humanitarian assistance, the US…’183 
‘the UK is the second largest donor of bilateral aid…’184 ‘Russia presented the initiative...’185 
Such public declarations can also be understood as ways to prove to the international 
community that they, as a permanent member of the UNSC, are living up to their 
responsibilities. When talking of their own contributions they often compare these efforts 
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with those made by others, accusing them of not doing enough. The comparisons are made to 
delegitimise other members of the P5 by highlighting their (in)action to the rest of the 
international community.   
 
Another similar practice, which is particularly prominent in speeches made by the P3, 
is the way they start or finish their speeches, whereby they make almost heroic sounding 
commitments to prove their determination. Again, this reinforces the narrative presented by 
each actor, that they are the protagonist of the story, heroically fighting on despite the 
obstacles. ‘We will not rest until the Council rises to meet its responsibilities.’186 ‘Let there 
be no mistake. This veto will not stop us.’187 These comments can be connected to the right 
side of history argument previously presented, whereby the P3 assume that interests which 
run counter to their own are wrong and define an actor as being on the wrong side of history. 
They are spoken with the confidence and expertise of a neutral and objective party who 
knows the ins and outs of the conflict. With this confidence they blame their opponents for 
the failures of the UNSC and ensure that any blame for UNSC inaction does not fall on their 
own shoulders.  
 
Another reference to expertise can be seen in the justifications used, by both Russia 
and the US, to justify their intervention in Syria. Both actors regularly cite counterterrorism 
as a justification, whilst simultaneously accusing ‘the other’ of using counterterrorism as an 
excuse to justify their illegitimate actions. Throughout the conflict, they regularly accuse one 
another of using counterterrorism as a ‘weapon for suspect geopolitical aims.’188 The US are 
joined by both France and the UK who also accuse the Russian forces of using 
counterterrorism to justify an illegitimate military campaign: ‘There can be no military 
justification for aerial attacks that indiscriminately hit civilians and their homes and 
hospitals.’189 In response, Russia relies on its self-professed expertise in fighting terrorists 
and states that ‘it is a well-known fact, that militants everywhere make a habit of locating 
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their military facilities in medical and educational institutions…’190 In retaliation, Russia 
accuses the US and the UK of creating the rise of terrorist groups and warns them against 
‘repeating their past mistakes, when in order to achieve their geopolitical goals of regime 
change in Afghanistan, Iran and Libya, they relied on the use of terrorists, hoping that the 
latter could be controlled later, once their geopolitical aims had been achieved.’191 It is ironic 
that both actors are using the same justifications whilst accusing others of abusing those 
justifications, but it reflects both the community’s different experiences with regards to 
terrorists, and of course the distrust amongst them as they both push for opposing objectives. 
 
This part of the analysis argued that each member of the P5 has constructed a 
narrative which frames the issues surrounding the conflict in a way that supports their desired 
course of action. Whilst they have each engaged in such a narrativization strategy, the 
practices they use to justify their narratives differ slightly. The narratives presented by the P3 
are similar and they also tend to rely on the same legitimation practices to legitimise their 
narrative. There are some references to authority but generally most statements are justified 
by references to morals and history. By contrast, the P2, whose narrative is similar in that 
they are opposing the P3’s version of events, utilise different methods and practices to 
legitimise it. They both rely heavily on references to authority and history, in particular the 
recent Libyan intervention. But Russia also relies on references to morals and responds to the 
emotional rhetoric of the P3 with more emotional rhetoric. Each of the actors legitimise their 
approach by regularly boasting of their contributions to the cause whilst they also seek to 
prove that their expertise is superior to that of their colleagues. Now that the various 
narrativization strategies have been considered, the analysis will consider the specific norms 
and interests each actor is seeking to protect or advance. 
 
 
5.2 - Moralistic vs Legalistic Rhetorical Practices 
 
This part of the analysis argues that UNSC activity is shaped by the rhetorical 
approaches adopted by the P5, which, as a result of the power asymmetry within the 
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organisation, have been primarily Western. The P3 often use emotional rhetoric and 
descriptive imagery which compliments their interest in pursuing a humanitarian approach 
that prioritises human rights over sovereignty and territorial integrity. By contrast, the P2, 
who seek to protect the Westphalian system, use rhetoric couched in legal terms and 
established norms which support a contradictory approach. As a result of the power 
imbalance in the UNSC, their influence over UNSC action is less pronounced, although they 
do act as a constraint on the P3. In order to demonstrate these points, the discussion will 
consider the following: what is being contested, which norms does this challenge, and how do 
actors promote their approach. 
 
The main problem the UNSC have faced over the course of the conflict is the fact that 
they are unable to agree on what the most appropriate response ought to be. Whether or not 
they are guided by their own national interests, the approaches that they are advocating 
challenge the norms surrounding the use of force. As previously discussed, the narrative 
projected by the P3 advocates for Assad to go, whilst the competing narrative promoted by 
the P2 prioritises the protection of sovereignty and pushes back against international 
interference. Thus, one of the most contested topics is the political transition, which continues 
to cause problems at the time of writing. The P3 regularly state that ‘The only viable political 
solution to the crisis is one without al-Assad in power,’192 and that, ‘Only a transition that 
safeguards the Syrian State and protects its minorities – without Assad – will generate a 
solution…’193 In the eyes of Russia and China, this is regime change. They are unwilling to 
apply the R2P concept in fear of a repeat of Libya, whereby Gaddafi was ousted under the 
pretext of humanitarian intervention. The approach adopted by the P3 challenges the norms 
surrounding sovereignty, territorial integrity and the limits of the exceptions surrounding the 
non-use of force. It advocates for intervention in the name of human rights, which is not 
currently an accepted justification for the use of force.  
 
In line with China’s approach to the UNSC, they respond by stressing the importance 
of a political settlement ‘in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations and the basic norms governing international relations,’ whilst opposing ‘any 
 
192 Statement by Ambassador Samantha Power, Permanent Representative of the United States to the United 
Nations, UNSC, S/PV.7433, 24th April 2015 
193 Statement by Ambassador François Delattre, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, 
UNSC, S/PV.7433, 24th April 2015 
59 
 
externally imposed solution aimed at forcing regime change,’194 or ‘military intervention 
under the pretext of humanitarianism.’195 As will be seen shortly, the principles of territorial 
integrity and sovereignty are hugely important for China and they are consistent about the 
need to protect them from abuse. As expected, Russia is particularly sensitive to ‘the anti-
Damascus campaign, which has not yet reached the place it deserves on the rubbish heap of 
history.’196 They use every opportunity to remind the Council of ‘the role [the Western 
troika] played in the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as a result 
of the American and British invasion of Iraq…’197 Russia is quick to point the finger, arguing 
that ‘some influential members of the international community, including some sitting at this 
table, have undermined any possibility of a political settlement, calling for regime change, 
encouraging the opposition towards power, indulging in provocation and nurturing the armed 
struggle.’198 Whilst the P2 use a different approach to one another, they are both pushing 
back against the practice of western-led interventions and the shift away from the 
Westphalian system. 
 
As recognised by Finnemore, disputes and disagreements like this are not uncommon 
in the UNSC and are best recognised as the norm not the exception.199 Throughout the 
conflict, as each actor battles to legitimise their narrative and enact their proposed course of 
action, they rely on references to established norms which are central to their identity to 
justify their approach. As theorised by Sandholtz and Stiles, references to foundational norms 
strengthen an actor’s argument as they engage those in the international community who also 
wish to prioritise the protection of those norms. Thus, as a result of the opposing narratives, 
the norms surrounding sovereignty, territorial integrity and human rights feature prominently 
throughout the dataset. The below table, which illustrates how many times each actor said 
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Table 2 – Word frequency for concepts ‘sovereignty’ and ‘territorial integrity’ 
 
 
The difference between the P3 and the P2 in the above table is particularly striking 
and demonstrates both the importance the P2 place on these values and the P3’s complete 
disregard for them. The repetition of these norms, which preserve Westphalian sovereignty, 
shows the international community that both Russia and China are opposed to aggressive 
forms of intervention and are using their position to oppose it. Whilst much of the literature 
treats the P2 as revisionist powers, challenging the workings of the UNSC, it is actually the 
P2 who are striving to defend the international system from changing. Cunliffe labels this 
‘reverse revisionism,’ since emerging powers, instead of challenging Western norms and 
values, are in fact defending the rules of non-interference established by Western powers 
themselves in 1945.200 Thus, if one considers the roles adopted by actors when contesting 
norms which were introduced when considering Bloomfield’s study, when seeking to protect 
the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, the P2 are adopting the role of norm 
antripreneur.201  
 
China is particularly clear and consistent about the need to ‘respect Syria’s 
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity,’202 as one can see in the results above. It 
reflects China’s approach to the UNSC as a whole, as they seek to demonstrate that they are a 
responsible international player, who is interested in adhering to international law and in 
preserving the international system, a point which will be further considered in the third part 
of the analysis. Russia’s use of these international norms is paradoxical; they pay lip service 
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China 51 94 
France 0 0 
Russia 50 47 
UK 9 5 
US 1 4 
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to the principle of non-intervention in UNSC meetings but do not always adhere to it in 
practice. As argued by Pieper, Russia is ‘using the same language’ to challenge Western 
interventions which result in regime change. He also concludes that Russia is not a revisionist 
power, but instead that they are striving to claim a voice in the normative conversation and 
achieve recognition as a great power.203 
 
By contrast, the P3 rely on humanitarian norms and the protection of human rights, 
knowing that this moralistic approach will engage others in the international community that 
have also internalised these norms. As one can see above, they rarely speak of sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. The fact that France did not once reference either concept can be 
linked to their approach towards the conflict from the very start which advocated for tough 
action and regime change. The absence of these concepts in speeches made by the P3 
demonstrates their willingness to redefine the international order into one which prioritises 
the protection of human rights over sovereignty and territorial integrity. When the conflict 
first arose, the P3 justified their proposed actions, which were more forceful in nature than 
those proposed by the P2, by arguing for the need to protect the right to peaceful protest, the 
freedom of the press and the right to democracy. The violation of these rights is not 
considered by the UNSC to constitute a threat to international peace and security and thus 
support for their proposed plans was initially limited.  
 
Whilst the P3 initially only relied on the protection of human rights, they were quick 
to recognise any breaches of other fundamental norms which could strengthen their case for 
tough action. As the conflict progressed, and more serious offenses were committed, they 
were able to rely on the norms which govern the rules of war and prohibit the use of chemical 
weapons, all of which engage a larger proportion of the international community. Arguments 
for more forceful action became ‘a question of respect for humanitarian law and our ability to 
restore a collective norm that has been openly flouted.’204 These norms represent such crucial 
components of the global security architecture and thus have more weight than others, such 
as the right to peaceful protest. Thus, as previously mentioned, they are particularly vocal 
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about the destruction of vital services and hospitals ‘which is contrary to all the rules of 
humanitarian law, respect for human dignity and the most basic principles of humankind.’205  
 
As is perhaps clear, the gap between law and legitimacy is growing in large part 
because of the interventions conducted by the US, often backed by the UK or France, which 
challenge the principle of non-intervention. Such behaviour can be understood as an attempt 
to reshape the normative environment to allow interventions in the name of human rights. 
The irony is that the P3 themselves are not exactly leading by example in respect of human 
rights, particularly the US who have conducted numerous international interventions and are 
reluctant to engage in international human rights agreements; for example they were the only 
member of the P5 that voted against the GA Resolution which established the Human Rights 
Council.206 Furthermore, as argued by Teimouri, punishing an actor for unlawful behaviour 
by resorting to the use of force without an authorised mandate is flawed.  He points out that 
the idea itself undermines the notion of ‘responsibility’ embedded in the R2P concept and 
concludes that the use of humanitarian law to justify the use of force is ‘counterproductive 
and prone to being abused.’207 Thus, whilst the P3 are willing to justify their actions on the 
protection of human rights, the legality of such a development is questionable and attracts 
much criticism. 
 
 The P3 have advocated for this humanitarian approach by adopting rhetorical 
practices which evoke emotions by using descriptive imagery and emotional rhetoric. This 
emotional practice, as previously discussed, is used ‘to prescribe moral emotions and 
affective ties as valid foundations of legitimacy judgements.’208 As previously mentioned, the 
21st century saw a shift in the subject matter of resolutions towards thematic issues like the 
protection of women, children and counterterrorism.209 The US are the driving force behind 
this change and their activity in the UNSC demonstrates how they are doing so. They 
regularly present personal stories of individuals in Syria using graphic descriptions and even 
presenting visual imagery, both of which provoke an emotional response and encourage the 
audience to take a moralistic approach. For example, they shared the stories of 10 year old 
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Shahad, ‘a little girl critically injured when the Al-Assad regime dropped a barrel bomb on 
her house;’210 ‘a photographer named Amin Al-Halabi [who] wrote on Facebook ‘I am 
waiting to die or be captured by the Al-Assad regime;’211 and Mazen Darwish, ‘who was 
charged with so-called crimes such as publishing human rights reports and documenting the 
names of people tortured.’212 These statements, whilst of course paying tribute to the many 
victims in Syria, are used as a persuasive technique to control emotions. The management of 
emotions, which involves the exercise of power, can be used as a tool to effectuate change.213  
 
The US are not alone in their drive to protect vulnerable groups of people, particularly 
women and children. Using the same technique, the UK also describe the personal stories of 
victims in Syria, sparing no sickening details. For example, on one occasion, they describe 
the horrific death of Mohammed Abdul-Razzuk Allashash who, following a chemical 
weapons attack, ‘lost consciousness… went red. Pink foam poured from his mouth. His 
pupils were dilated. His lungs crackling. His heartbeat and breathing stopped…’214 before he 
died, at just 6 years old. Both the UK and the US are advocates of the R2P concept, and thus 
would do well to present a case for those that are in need of protection. Interestingly, the shift 
towards the protection of vulnerable groups has been recognised by both Russia and China. 
In UNSC meetings China voiced concern for ‘the profound suffering to vast numbers of 
civilians, in particular vulnerable groups such as women and children,’215 albeit in a far less 
descriptive and emotional manner than the P3. However, it is not possible to say whether this 
recognition of the norm is because they have internalised it, or because they want other actors 
to believe that they have internalised it because they know it has become more widely 
accepted. 
 
 As well as retelling personal stories, the US on a number of occasions make use of 
visual imagery in the form of photographs and newspaper headlines. A recent study by 
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Lefsrud, Graves and Phillips recognised the role played by images in legitimacy work, 
providing that ‘we are swimming in a sea of words and images designed to legitimate or 
delegitimate.’216 This practice, which makes use of visual realia, is again designed to evoke 
emotions and thus influence the legitimacy judgements of others. Two examples of this 
practice will be presented. The first example is the use of newspaper headlines which reflect 
the sickening horrors of the conflict and seek to delegitimise Assad and his supporters. ‘‘It’s 
like the end of the world’ – the New York Times, ‘‘Breaking Point’; babies freezing to death 
amid Idlib push’ – Al Jazeera, ‘These people are begging the world to listen to their plight’ – 
CNN.’217 The second example occurred in 2018 when the US hosted the UNSC at an exhibit 
titled ‘Syria: Please Don’t Forget Us’ at the United States Holocaust Museum. The event was 
hosted to prove that ‘we will not cease in our efforts to know the truth of the Al-Assad regime 
– and ensure that the truth is known and acted on by the international community.’218 Both 
examples demonstrate behaviour unique to the US, who happen to be the driving force 
behind the humanitarian approach, and can be understood as attempts to influence the 
judgement of others by encouraging them to also adopt a moralistic approach. 
 
The behaviour, which advocates for a moralistic approach as opposed to a legalistic 
one, is met with much resistance by those seeking to protect the principle of non-intervention. 
Russia is particularly sensitive to such practices and frequently criticises the US for its use of 
photographs, newspaper headlines and personal accounts of the conflict, many of which are 
labelled as propaganda and inappropriate for the purposes of UNSC speeches. Whilst the 
following study only considers the activity inside the UNSC, it is important to note that such 
efforts, which persuade others to think about the situation in a certain way, are not limited to 
the UNSC. For example, in May 2020 the UK government made headlines after Britain’s 
‘propaganda war’ against ISIS and Assad was exposed. It was reported by a number of media 
outlets who described how, ‘using news agencies, social media, poster campaigns and even 
children’s comics, communications companies working under contract to the British 
government attempted to undermine both the Assad government and the Islamic State group 
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and bolster elements within the Syrian opposition.’219 Whilst the current study does not have 
the time and space to consider the activity of each member outside of the UNSC, it is useful 
to remember that there are efforts made by each actor which all form part of the campaign 
being presented inside the UNSC. 
 
When considering these efforts, both inside and outside the UNSC, it is interesting to 
consider the communicative power each actor has, as per Sandholtz and Stiles. 220 The P3, 
have significantly greater communicative power within the international community than the 
P2, which undoubtedly gives them an advantage when seeking to persuade. Furthermore, as 
is discussed in much of the literature on UNSC reform, the resources available to members of 
the UN are completely disproportionate, even within the UNSC where ‘delegations of non-
permanent members can be simply overwhelmed by delegations of members such as the 
US.’221 Thus the fact that one member of the P5 permanently hosts the UNSC on their own 
territory is undoubtedly going to give them an advantage and, as the previous examples 
illustrate, the opportunity to engage the audience in institutions and environments on US 
territory which, inevitably, accord legitimacy to the US frame of events.  
 
 By contrast the P2, who have less communicative power than the P3, rely on 
international law and established practice to advance their own interests. As previously 
discussed, both regularly rely on references to authority to (de)legitimise. The approach 
prioritises law and order, and the rhetorical practices used by both actors endorse this. 
Throughout the conflict, the P2 made more references to international law than the P3 which 
could be for a number of reasons. It could be a case of reverse revisionism, as per Cunliffe; 
whereby both actors are striving to protect the law and norms which were formed in the 
aftermath of WWII which prohibit the use of force.222 However, it could also be that their 
words and actions are being couched in law and legal terminology to give them a veneer of 
legitimacy and conceal their true intentions. What was not clear from the research, was 
whether international law is used to perpetuate selection bias, as per Deplano’s study 
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previously discussed.223 For whatever reason, the result of adopting such rhetorical practices 
serves as a balance against the P3, who often cherry pick law and norms to suit their desired 
course of action. Whilst they are unable to prevent the P3 from undertaking unilateral actions 
or interventions, they can prevent the UNSC from being turned into an organisation which 
authorises intervention and regime change in the name of human rights, as has been proved in 
Syria. 
 
 This part of the analysis demonstrated how rhetorical practices are used to influence 
legitimacy judgements and steer UNSC activity. The P5 are paralysed by competing interests 
in Syria and the norms surrounding the use of force, including those of sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and non-intervention. The P2 regularly cite these norms and other laws which 
demonstrates their desire to protect them and prevent an international intervention. By 
contrast, the P3 rarely make references to these norms and instead adopt emotional rhetoric 
which advocates for a moralistic approach as opposed to a legalistic one. As a result of the 
power imbalance within the UNSC they have succeeded in steering the UNSC to recognise 
that the protection of human rights deserves a greater part to play in the activity of the 
organisation. However, due to resistance from the P2 and other members of the international 
community who doubt the legality of such action, the practice is far from being normalised. 
 
5.3 - The Importance of UNSC Legitimacy  
 
The final part of the analysis argues that the different approaches adopted by each 
actor are defined by the importance each actor places in the organisation and how much they 
depend on it for international legitimacy. The tone used by each member of the P5 varies 
significantly and can be explained by the amount each actor relies on their membership in the 
UNSC for international prestige. The P3, primarily led by the US, cherry pick laws and 
norms to suit their own interests with little concern paid to the hypocrisy in their actions. By 
contrast, the P2, who collectively have less communicative power and great power status, 
appeal to the P3 to follow international law and norms which can be understood as an attempt 
to both bring them to heel and to show the international community that they are responsible 
international players and thus worthy of legitimacy. In order to demonstrate these points, the 
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following will be considered: how and why the tone of each actor differs, whether the 
legitimacy of the UNSC is valued, and finally how actors seek to protect UNSC legitimacy. 
 
The approach adopted by the P5 in the UNSC differs according to their confidence as 
an international player, a confidence which is informed by their status as a great power. 
Confidence in this context meaning ‘a feeling or consciousness of one’s powers or of reliance 
on one’s circumstances.’224 On one extreme is the US, who are prone to leading unilateral 
interventions, guided by their supposed moral superiority which trumps any norms that ought 
to prevent such actions. As the crisis in Syria proved, they provided few, if any, justifications 
for their intervention, assuming that their humanitarian motivations alone were enough. On 
the other extreme is China, who are particularly wary and critical of such practices but, in line 
with UNSC formality, refrain from direct confrontations and instead urge the UNSC to 
uphold international law and protect the system which prevents the use of force. These 
approaches reflect the extent each player relies on the UNSC for legitimacy and international 
prestige. They are influenced by each member’s respective foreign policies, which define 
their view of the world and where they see themselves in it, each of which will briefly be 
considered.  
 
First to consider is America, who has a ‘long-standing belief, common to both citizens 
and elites, that America and Americans are somehow exceptional,’225 and thus suppose that 
‘when the US actually uses its exceptional power and wealth to promote a double standard… 
it proposes that different rules apply to itself than applies to the rest of the world.’226 In 
practice in the UNSC, the US regularly use an assertive tone which implies that it is not going 
to seek permission and instead must be followed. Often sentences began with phrases such as 
‘Let me be clear. The United States believes…’227 and ‘Let there be no doubt…’228 both of 
which sound slightly arrogant. Compared to the other members of the P5, the US use more 
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informal language, sometimes colloquial, with less references to international law and more 
references to what is acceptable for the US and what is not. This reflects the fact that the US 
does not believe that it needs the UNSC for status and prestige; it sees itself as the leading 
global power. This can also explain why the US is so confident when driving forward a new, 
humanitarian approach. It does not care whether established norms and laws are disregarded 
because it believes it has the power and moral superiority to change them.  
 
 Next China, who maintain a formal and legalistic tone throughout the research and 
prioritise adherence to international law. Whilst China promote a multipolar world, it now 
sees the cultural hegemonism of the West as a threat to China’s socialist values and is thus 
positioning itself as a counterweight to the West.229 China’s commitment to a strict legal 
approach which prioritises adherence to law can be understood as an attempt to demonstrate 
to the international community that China is responsible and worthy of great power status. 
Throughout the conflict the speeches delivered by China gradually became longer, although 
in general they are shorter than those of the other members. This reflects the recent change in 
China’s foreign policy to ‘participate in the formulation of international norms… [and] 
strengthen our country’s discourse power and influence in international legal affairs…’230  
 
Russia treats the UNSC in a similar way to China, although it engages more actively 
in argumentation and norm making. This reflects the fact that Russia believes it is entitled to 
great power status and a regional hegemonic role.231 Russia uses law and order to 
demonstrate that it too is a responsible international player whilst also pointing out the 
instances in which the P3 are failing to adhere to their international legal commitments. The 
UNSC is particularly important for both Russia and China as it gives them a voice in 
arguably one of the most prestigious international forums. This can explain why they treat the 
UNSC with respect, preferring to stick to established law and practice, whilst also ensuring 
the UNSC remains the primary actor responsible for responding to threats to international 
peace and security. 
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 Both the UK and France promote multilateralism whilst relying on the US and NATO 
for security and to promote their interests. They are less confident than the US in the UNSC, 
which reflects the recognition that they are not leading powers and thus need the status of 
permanent membership more than the US. Evidence of this insecurity can be seen in the 
1990s when, during their one-month presidency, the UK quickly secured the transition of the 
USSR’s membership to Russia, fearing that any reform would lose their seat on the UNSC. 
They justified the tactical decision by arguing that the Gulf crisis proved the P5 were worthy 
of this status, expressed by then President John Major with the slogan ‘Why change a 
winning team.’232 The UK, like the US, use emotional language, although their speeches are 
slightly more formal than those of the US. They likewise believe that their own interests and 
morals are superior, thus on one occasion the UK Ambassador refused to express thanks to 
the President, who at the time was the Russian Ambassador, for casting a veto. ‘I normally 
begin my statements in the Council with the words ‘Thank you, Mr President.’ I cannot do 
that today, because today we have seen the fifth veto of a vote on Syria… from you, Mr 
President.’233  
 
Whilst France was previously more reluctant to accept American hegemony, it has 
shifted its stance in recent years which can be understood as a reflection of France’s desire to 
be recognised as a co-promoter of a liberal world order. France is slightly more confident and 
forceful than the UK and regularly uses non-legal, descriptive language which is filled with 
adjectives and drama, another emotional strategy used to drive forward their campaign 
against Assad. The leading role that France adopted in the anti-Assad campaign has been 
interpreted as a desire to redefine France as a great power,234 a speculation which certainly 
matches the tone used by France in the UNSC. One example of the confidence displayed by 
France is when they launched a ‘pragmatic partnership that brings together states that reject 
the impunity for individuals involved in chemical-weapon attacks or in the development of 
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chemical weapons programmes.’235 Unlike Russia when they launched the Astana Process, 
they did not rely on the UN to legitimise the institution and instead assumed that the 
institution itself was legitimate, since it was supported by themself and other like-minded 
actors. Unsurprisingly, Russia criticised France for ‘cobbling together narrow groups of like-
minded people… [and] undermining the authority of international bodies.’236 It is striking 
that, compared to Russia, France was so confident presenting a new initiative, which also 
undermines the UN. It demonstrates the reality of the international system whereby western 
(P3) initiatives are assumed to be right and therefore legitimate, whilst non-western (P2) 
initiatives are assumed to be wrong and so illegitimate.  
  
 The P5 recognise that, in order to maintain their status and prestige as permanent 
members, the legitimacy of the UNSC must be maintained. However, as the analysis has 
shown, the US are less concerned about how their actions may affect the legitimacy of the 
organisation. Hurd provides that an organisation can lose legitimacy ‘if the institution is 
dominated by one actor, or if it consistently fails to live up to the ideals and principles which 
justify it.’237 Both possibilities currently threaten the UNSC and in an effort to maintain the 
legitimacy of the organisation the P5 urge one another to change their approach. However, 
such statements are not only voiced to protect the legitimacy of the UNSC. When such 
comments are made by the P3, they can be interpreted as an attempt to shame the other into 
compliance, as per Ralph and Gifkins.238 They often talk of the collective failure of the 
UNSC to fulfil its responsibility; ‘We have to concede that we have all failed. We have all 
been losers… We have to do better and we have to do better fast.’239 Such comments are 
often followed with a motivational drive: ‘the world is watching and waiting on us. Let us 
rise to our responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations.’240 All of which can be 
understood as part of the emotional strategy used by the P3 to prove that they are right whilst 
their opponents are on the wrong side of history.  
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When such accusations come from the P2, they are more often than not attempts to 
protect the status and legitimacy of the UNSC and its traditional norms. But they both also 
use the protection of UNSC legitimacy as a way to delegitimise the P3 by highlighting 
practices which are contrary to the spirit or practices of the UNSC. On one occasion Russia 
commented on the stupidity of the UNSC meeting underway, the outcome of which could be 
predicted before the meeting had even begun. ‘We are about to vote on two draft resolutions, 
and we are all perfectly aware that neither of them will be adopted.’241 The comment was 
made to criticise the P3 and their practices in the UNSC, accusing them of rushing to the vote 
without spending enough time at the negotiation stage. China is also particularly critical of 
such practices, arguing that it ‘is not conducive to the unity of the Security Council.’242 In a 
calm manner, China regularly reminds the members of their responsibilities as permanent 
members: 
 
I would also like to take this opportunity to point out that the Security Council is the 
core of our collective security regime. Every Council member bears the sacred 
responsibility of maintaining int. peace and should define its national position in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN and on the merits of the case 
under discussion.243 
 
Such comments made by the P2 reflect their desire to preserve the legitimacy of the UNSC 
which, in the absence of, would affect their status as players with a voice in one of the most 
important international security forums.  
 
Another practice used to delegitimise other actors, disguised as an attempt to protect 
the legitimacy of the UNSC, is to highlight instances where the formal Rules of Procedure 
have not been followed. Of course, the practice may be used in good faith but, based on the 
fact that such occurrences are usually targeted towards actors with opposing interests, are also 
used to delegitimise those actors. On several occasions, members of the P3 commented on 
speeches made by the Syrian representative who ‘consistently shows a lack of respect by 
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abusing our time, exceeding the 5 minutes recommended by presidential note 5/2017/507 
every time he speaks,’244 whilst also using his platform to vilify other UNSC members and 
the UN itself which ‘is an affront to this organ and the rules-based international order.’245 
Such statements fit perfectly into the P3 narrative, in which Syria is the number one 
antagonist. Russia also regularly refer to the formal Rules of Procedure. On one occasion, 
when accusing the P3 of rushing to the vote, the Russian Ambassador claimed that the draft 
resolution put forward ‘violates the Security Council’s rules of procedure, since the draft 
resolution was put into blue only at 11.20am this morning and cannot be voted on before 
tomorrow morning, in accordance with the 24-hour rule.’246 This comment fits nicely into the 
Russian narrative, whereby the P3 disregard international law and norms whilst Russia strives 
to protect them. Both examples demonstrate the way actors can use the protection of UN 
legitimacy as a way to delegitimise their opponents.   
 
The P3 take this one step further by targeting the P2’s use of the veto, declaring it to 
be ‘a cynical abuse of the privileges and responsibilities of permanent membership.’247 As 
previously established, the veto does give the P5 a considerable strategic advantage when 
contesting norms.248 The P3 know that the international community are sensitive to the veto 
rights of the P5 and know that highlighting a perceived abuse of this right, will cause a stir 
amongst the wider UN membership. Such declarations of course compliment their campaign 
and form part of the narrative which assumes that the interests of the P3 are on the right side 
of history. As expected, these accusations are met with a highly emotional response as Russia 
and China defend their right to use the veto and their position as permanent members. Like 
many other accusations in the UNSC, the arguments are turned around and used against their 
sponsors, as did Russia in the following example. ‘We have heard many insulting words 
today with regard to out right to the veto – our right. We have won it and have exercised it in 
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a responsible manner, but we use it only in such circumstances when others in the Security 
Council try to impose their irresponsible geopolitical projects.’249  
 
Even China responds to such accusations with a slightly more assertive tone than 
usual, arguing that ‘all countries are entitled to voice their opinions, make recommendations 
on issues and determine their voting positions independently, in accordance with their own 
principled positions.’250 These points, made by both Russia and China, about the right to veto, 
are indeed what the UN Charter provides. Yet, in an effort to put an end to such practices, 
France once drafted a resolution which allowed ‘for the suspension of the resort to the veto 
by permanent member States in cases of mass atrocities.’251 Whilst the resolution was not 
passed, it demonstrates the perceived moral superiority of the P3 who believe that voting 
practices contrary to their own are illegitimate.  
 
 The final part of the analysis argued that the approach adopted by each member of the 
P5 is a reflection of their confidence as a great power. At one end of the spectrum is the US, 
who consider themself to be the leading power and thus assume that they can disregard the 
rules when it suits their interests. On the other end of the spectrum is China, who is less 
confident as a leading power and strives to present itself as a respectable alternative to the US 
by adhering to established practices and international law. Russia adopts a similar approach, 
although engages in more confrontations with the P3, fighting to regain its former power 
status. Both France and the UK are less confident than the US, but due to sharing the same 
interests, benefit from US dominance. The P5 are aware of the need to protect UNSC 
legitimacy, although this concern is not as important for the US who do not depend on UN 
legitimacy as much as the other players. Each actor regularly refers to the need to adhere to 
the established practices of the organisation, both as a way to uphold the legitimacy of the 
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6 - Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this research was to re-emphasise the concept of legitimacy in the 
study of normative change by analysing the rhetorical practices and patterns of behaviour 
used by actors when contesting norms. The discourse of the five permanent members of the 
UNSC was analysed and the findings were explored in three parts. The first part 
demonstrated how each actor has constructed a narrative which is used to legitimise their own 
interests whilst simultaneously delegitimising the interests or actions of others. The second 
part argued that UNSC activity is shaped by the rhetorical practices used by actors to 
legitimise their narrative. The moralistic approach lobbied by the P3 has a greater influence 
on UNSC practice due to the imbalance of power in the UNSC. The final part argued that the 
approach adopted by each actor is influenced by their view of great power politics and where 
they see themselves in the global order. The most confident member of the P5, the US, pays 
less attention to law and norms and instead is guided by its moral superiority. By contrast, the 
other members are less confident about their status in the international system and are thus 
more interested in preserving the legitimacy of the UNSC by playing by the rules. This final 
section will reconsider the research questions whilst drawing necessary conclusions to the 
results of the analysis. The following questions were asked: 
 
1. How do actors legitimise themselves? 
2. How do actors try to influence the legitimacy judgements of others? 
 
The main strategy used by each member of the P5 is to construct a narrative which 
frames the issues in a way that compliments their desired course of action. The practice of 
storytelling is used by each of the actors and allows them to paint a picture of the conflict 
which categorises others involved in the conflict as either good actors or bad actors. 
Unsurprisingly, the bad actors are also those that do not share the same interests as the 
narrator. It is in this sense, that Bob was right to conclude that actors engaged in normative 
contestation cannot be distinguished from one another as they are all ‘rival entrepreneurs in 
warring networks’.252 These narratives are justified using references to authority, morals, 
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history and assurances of each actor’s expertise in the matter. The amount each actor utilises 
each of these legitimation strategies is what differentiates them from one another.  
 
References to authority and other legitimate things are used primarily by China and 
Russia, although the P3 also utilise this strategy. Whilst the P3 drive forward a humanitarian 
approach to international interventions, citing references to human rights and the norms 
surrounding the prohibition of chemical weapons, the P2 fight back in an effort to ensure the 
norms they support remain relevant. They regularly use law, norms and order to defend the 
legal based normative system from morphing into one guided by western morals. Such a 
drive by the P3 is justified with references to morals which are primarily used to delegitimise 
the villains in their narrative. The emotional strategies that are used, most prominently by the 
US, are designed to evoke emotions in the audience and influence their legitimacy 
judgements.  
 
All members use references to history to legitimise their narratives, albeit with a 
different intention. The P3 strive to convince the international community that if they do not 
take action fast, history will repeat itself and the members of the P5 that prevented such 
action will find themselves on the wrong side of history. By contrast, the P2 use the recent 
memory of Libya and other western-led interventions to justify their stance against such a 
practice and regularly make references to the disastrous aftermath in Libya which followed 
the NATO-led intervention. All of the above is justified using references to each actor’s self-
professed expertise in the conflict, as well as a public display of how much they have been 
contributing to the cause.  
 
Evidence of these legitimation practices proves that language and rhetoric are hugely 
important when studying normative contestation. As the second part argued, UNSC activity is 
influenced by the rhetorical strategies used by the P5, which as a result of the power 
imbalance within the UNSC are primarily western. The P3, led by the US, use emotional 
strategies to persuade the international community that humanitarian issues ought to play a 
greater part in the international response to threats to peace and security. They successfully 
led the UNSC to consider the protection of vulnerable groups of people a legitimate reason 
for concern, thus shaping the normative conversation to match their own interests. Using 
emotional rhetoric which makes use of descriptive imagery and visual realia is a strategy 
which seeks to redirect the normative conversation from one which prioritises sovereignty 
76 
 
and territorial integrity to one that recognises that human rights and morals ought to be 
centre-stage. However, ironically, but in line with the right side of history argument, it is only 
the morals of the P3 which are taken into consideration due to their supposed superiority in 
this field, despite their own track record of supporting international human rights agreements. 
In an effort to defend the principle of non-intervention, the P2 fight back to protect the 
international system and the former status quo. The language they use, couched in law and 
authority, ensures their interests stay relevant; however due to having less communicative 
power, they are unable to prevent a gradual international acceptance of the P3’s morals.  
 
All of the above is informed by each actor’s view of great power politics and how 
much they rely on their status as a permanent member of the UNSC for international 
legitimacy. Thus, the US, a former leading power, remains confident in its abilities to shape 
the international system and continues to try and reshape the normative conversation to suit 
its own interests. By contrast, China is slowly positioning itself as a counterweight to the US 
and is thus using the UNSC to demonstrate to the international community that it will respect 
international law, the sovereignty of other states and the international system. In a similar 
vein, Russia is also determined to challenge the interests of the US, although they depend 
much more on the legitimacy of the UNSC for international prestige. As a result, both 
members are particularly vocal about respecting the rules of the organisation, in order to 
preserve its legitimacy, whilst also delegitimising those that have abused those rules. Both the 
UK and France are less confident about their place in the international system, but fortunately 
for them, can rely on the US, who shares their interests, to lead the way.  
 
As a result of their regular clashes and refusal to cooperate with one another in a 
respectful manner, the legitimacy of the UNSC is often threatened. The P5 are aware of this 
and each make attempts to disassociate themself from these unproductive practices and 
present themself as a worthy permanent member. It is unfortunate that a dishonest attempt to 
use the UN to increase one’s legitimacy can lead to a decrease in the legitimacy of the UN. 
Whether the UNSC will remain the central actor responsible for responding to threats to 
peace and security will depend on the collective response to future conflicts and if the P5 are 
able to work together. The conflict in Syria has caused the normative conversation to change, 
but not just in the predictable way that is often presented, whereby the future of the R2P 
concept is uncertain. Most importantly, it has changed the record and demonstrated that the 
P2 are willing to put their foot down and prevent the P3 from steering the normative 
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conversation to one of western interests and values. The increased confidence in both Russia 
and China to challenge the US is influencing the normative conversation; the Syrian conflict 
demonstrates the changing global order which is seeing a decline of the US and a rise of other 
international players, two of whom are able to voice their interests in arguably the most 
important international security forum. 
 
This research study proves that analysing normative contestation without considering 
processes of legitimacy is insufficient. The legitimation practices adopted by actors, when 
contesting norms, to influence the legitimacy judgements of others, are crucial to 
understanding how the normative conversation is shaped. The rhetorical practices, used by 
actors to contest norms, demonstrate how new interests and practices are advanced. The fact 
that such practices are used to influence the legitimacy judgements of both the UNSC 
members, and the international community, indicate why this finding is so important. 
Without paying attention to the words and symbols used by actors who are seeking to 
persuade, one is unable to recognise the effect such persuasive methods might have on 
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